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THE EFFECTS OF PRICING ON THE SALES FORCE AND THE FIRM: 





      Previous research has examined the dysfunctional relationships often encountered 
between marketing and sales, and the importance of cooperation and coordination 
between these two functional areas.  But no prior studies have investigated the 
consequences of misaligned pricing and sales force compensation strategies that emerge 
from these two functional areas. This dissertation examines the impact of the firm’s 
pricing strategy on the sales force, and evaluates the importance of identifying the 
misalignment of goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies as a 
potential root cause of disappointing program outcomes. Essay 1 uses in-depth qualitative 
interviews with business-to-business (B2B) salespeople and sales managers across 
several industries to examine the nature and ramifications of strategic misalignment of 
pricing and sales compensation approaches. Based on extant literature and insights from 
the field, a series of potential relationships are proposed between pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies. Essay 2 examines the effects of misalignment of goals of the 
pricing and sales force compensation strategies on the salesperson’s expectancy, 
instrumentality, motivation, and behavioral intention. A scenario-based experimental 
design is used to test the hypotheses in Essay 2 based on data collected from salespeople. 
v 
 
The findings of this dissertation suggest that understanding the impact of the firm’s 
pricing strategy on the salesperson is an unstudied yet critical factor influencing sales and 
marketing program success.   
 
Keywords: pricing strategy, sales force compensation strategy, marketing sales 
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 Poor financial performance of a business can be attributed to a variety of possible 
reasons within sales and marketing, including failures of proper product development, 
ineffective promotion, and misidentified target markets (Rouziès et al., 2005).  The lack 
of communication between marketing and sales also has been suggested as a root cause 
of the problem (Hughes, LeBon, & Malshe, 2012; Cross et al., 2001; Maltz & Kohli, 
1996; Strahle & Spiro, 1986).  Indeed, the necessity for decisions to be coordinated 
across marketing and sales has been underscored in previous research (Cespedes & 
Piercy, 1996; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1986; Menon, Bharadwaj, & Howell, 1996).  
Diagnosis of problems may be impeded, however, by the assumption that marketing and 
sales strategies, in particular pricing and sales force compensation strategies, are 
congruent and therefore aligned toward the same types of goals, such as market share 
growth or profit maximization.  
Despite significant research on dysfunctional relationships between marketing and 
sales and the importance of cooperation and coordination between these two functional 






detrimental consequences of misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies or the potential benefits to the firm of aligning these strategies. 
Poor performance may be misdiagnosed because the true root of the problem, the 
misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies, is undetected. 
While suggestions for enhanced communication between the functional areas may be 
helpful, poor performance may persist if the functional areas are not communicating 
about the fundamental elements of strategy (Hutt, 1995; Malshe & Sohi, 2009; Menon, 
Bhardwaj, Adidam, and Edison, 1999).   
The marketing and sales functions are principally responsible for revenue 
generation for the firm. In particular, marketing considers competitive pressures and 
customer preferences when establishing the revenue per unit for a company’s products 
and services through the pricing strategies. Similarly, the sales function determines the 
forecasts for overall sales revenue and is accountable for achieving these goals. Hence, an 
organization’s pricing strategy has a direct relationship with the creation and 
implementation of an organization’s advertising and sales strategies (Homburg, Jensen, & 
Hahn, 2012; Lancioni & Gattorna, 1993).  When marketing and sales work well together, 
the organization benefits. But when discord occurs between the functional areas, it 
produces negative organizational effects (Cespedes et al., 1996; Dewsnap & Jobber, 
2000; Strahle, Spiro, & Acito, 1996).    
Problem Setting 
The impetus for this dissertation emerged from a real-world problem that 





dissertation occurred in a Fortune-250 B2B company in which misaligned goals of the 
pricing strategy and sales force compensation strategy led to a series of ineffective 
outcomes, in part because the true problem (misaligned goals) was never examined.  
Consider the following example from the company: A supplier carries two brands within 
a product line offering, Brand A and Brand B. The supplier’s salespeople sell the two 
products with different brands to retailers. The marketing department of the supplier 
organization implements a pricing strategy designed to grow the market share of Brand A 
in a specific geographic area by offering the product at a discounted price for a limited 
time.  A similar strategy is not implemented for Brand B. 
 The marketing department set an initial period of three months for the discounted 
price.  Progress evaluations were to be held at the end of each month. At the end of the 
first month, the discounted priced Brand A had lower sales than the previous month’s 
sales when there was no discounted price.  The reason was the sales force responsible for 
selling the two products had de-emphasized selling the discounted product Brand A.  As 
a result of lower sales of Brand A, inventory levels remained high and the pricing 
strategy objectives were not met.  Marketing managers expected to sell more of Brand A 
because of the discounted price, but this did not happen because of the lack of support of 
the sales force.  
The marketing department of the supplier grew anxious about failing to meet the 
goal of growing marketing share within the targeted region and decided to offer an 
incentive directly to the salespeople for each unit of Brand A sold.  But the incentive 





As a result, at the end of the second month sales of the discounted product continued to 
decrease from the norm and sales of the higher priced brand increased.  
After a considerable amount of management input, the company decided to 
increase the promotion of the discounted brand for the final month by adding a third daily 
delivery time for retailers in the area to receive orders of Brand A.  In contrast, 
competitors in the same geographic area only offered two deliveries per day.  This extra 
service required that the supplier hire a driver and add another vehicle to the fleet. 
Management believed that this extra service, coupled with the discounted price of Brand 
A and the sales incentive to the salespeople would help to achieve the goal of growing 
market share of Brand A.  
At the end of the third and final month of the discounted price promotion, the 
overall net result was a shift in sales from the discounted brand to the higher priced 
brand.  Moreover, the sales of Brand A did not support the cost of the driver or the 
vehicle added for the additional delivery time.  Follow up inquiries determined that 
customers had established purchasing frequencies based on two deliveries per day and the 
third daily delivery did not increase the overall volume of purchases. Instead, it merely 
spread existing demand across three deliveries instead of two. After the three month 
promotional pricing period, the supplier discontinued the third daily delivery.   
Investigation into the failed three-month promotion yielded an unexpected result 
for the supplier.  The sales force compensation strategy of the company was based on 
maximizing profit by paying the sales force commission based on gross margins.  All 
sales progress reports for the sales force were generated to show the contribution margin, 





salespeople were selling more of the undiscounted Brand B, the pricing strategy to grow 
the market share of Brand A failed, and the company did not meet its goals for the period. 
It appeared, therefore, that the failure to align the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies was the reason the goal of increasing market share was not achieved.  
Moreover, throughout the temporary discounted price period, the firm attempted to 
modify the initial marketing strategy, but their efforts resulted in inefficiencies for the 
firm and reduced goodwill with the firm’s customers. Unfortunately, even in highly 
successful companies such as this Fortune-250 company, pressures to decide and act 
swiftly often supplant careful consideration of the true root of problems.  
 Why might a firm’s pricing and sales force compensation strategies not be 
aligned?  There are two main reasons. First, marketing and sales may have different 
orientations, with marketing being product-focused and sales being customer-focused 
(Cespedes et al., 1996; Homburg et al., 2007).  Moreover, these orientations may 
encompass different, potentially non-overlapping facets of the environment. For example, 
a product-focused orientation may lead the marketing function to consider the level of 
research and development that went into the product creation, next generation products 
on the horizon, or the positioning of the product within the firm’s product portfolio 
(Rouziès et al., 2005; Ruekert & Walker Jr, 1987).  In contrast, the typical customer-
focused orientation of the sales function may lead to an emphasis on the customer’s in-
house financial pressures, purchases of competing products of the supplier the customer 
is considering, or attempts to meet the custom needs of the customer. These two different 





the fact that the two strategies may be set in different divisions of the firm independently 
of one another (Rouziès et al., 2005).  
A second reason pricing and sales force compensation strategies may not be 
naturally aligned is that the two strategies have different temporal influences (Cespedes, 
1995; Cespedes et al., 1996; Homburg, Jensen, and Krohmer, 2008).  For example, in the 
heat of day-to-day competition, the pricing strategy, the quickest lever of the marketing 
mix for organizations to adjust, often morphs in reaction to external forces, such as 
changes from competitors, customers, suppliers, or even regulatory events. Adjustments 
to pricing strategies can be considered short term because the frequencies may happen 
annually or even many times within a year. In contrast, sales force compensation strategy 
tends to be more stable, and guided by internally established goals, such as growing 
market share in specific regions or product segments, or increasing contribution margin 
profit (referred to as profit maximization) (Küster and Canales, 2011).  For example, 
through the process of evaluating the customer’s needs a salesperson would direct the 
customer toward the most profitable product or service solution. These divergent 
influences can result in a lack of goal congruence across the two strategies. 
Purpose and Contribution 
The purpose of this two-essay dissertation is to examine the impact the firm’s 
pricing strategy may have on the sales force, and to determine the importance of 
identifying goal misalignment of pricing and sales force compensation strategies as a 
potential root cause of program failure. The dissertation takes a sales force-centric view 
of misalignment by focusing on the effects of a firm’s pricing strategy on the sales force 





is based is illustrated below. Essay 1 focuses on the core firm-level and functional-level 
outcomes of the alignment of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies and how 
these outcomes shape sales force behavior. The outcomes are identified using in-depth 
qualitative interviews with B2B salespeople and sales managers across industries to delve 
into the nature, identification, and ramifications of strategic misalignment. A series of 
propositions are examined to determine the relationships between the extant literature in 
pricing and sales force compensation, and perceptions from field interviews.  
Conceptual framework: Pricing and sales force compensation strategy
 
 
Essay 2 focuses on identifying the effects of misaligned goals of the pricing and 





expectancy, instrumentality, motivation, and behavioral performance.  A scenario-based 
experimental design was used to test the hypotheses in Essay 2.  
The contribution of this research is three-fold. First, the marketing-sales interface 
literature will be extended by identifying the importance of aligning the goals of the 
pricing and sales force compensation strategies. Specifically, the dissertation will 
examine the degree to which this key, though perhaps overlooked, joint-planning activity 
needs to be addressed for a firm to be successful. Second, the models of selling success 
are enhanced by determining the nature of the dependency of the sales function upon the 
alignment of pricing and sales force compensation strategies. Third, the areas in which 
misaligned pricing and sales force compensation strategies can affect salesperson 
performance through the salesperson’s motivation will be described.   
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 
This dissertation draws upon three general bodies of literature that are 
traditionally treated separately: the marketing-sales interface, pricing strategy, and sales 
force management. From the intersection of these domains, this dissertation examines 
propositions related to the effects of the misalignment of pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies on the organization (Essay 1), and develops and tests hypotheses 
relating to the interaction and impact of these two strategies on the salesperson (Essay 2). 
The key background literature that provides a foundation for this dissertation is presented 
in this section.  
Marketing-Sales Interface 
 Extant literature defines the marketing-sales interface as the relational 





of one group is contingent on the other (Cespedes et al., 1996).  Scholars in the sales 
domain have suggested that “in most companies, marketing and sales organizations are 
separate functions with different perspectives on how best to manage customer 
relationships” (Bradford et al., 2010, p. 248). Moreover, these different perspectives can 
be a major obstacle to managing joint activities across the two functions (Bradford et al., 
2010; Homburg et al., 2007).  In their research on the effects of the marketing-sales 
disconnect on effective marketing communication programs, Smith, Gopalakrishna, and 
Chatterjee (2006, p. 577) highlight the “crippling disconnect between the marketing and 
sales functions within many organizations, resulting in large amounts of wasted 
expenditures and energy for the firm”.  Existing research on the marketing-sales interface 
is important for this research because product pricing strategies generally originate from 
the marketing department, whereas sales force compensation strategies are developed by 
the sales department. While these two departments often operate in functional silos, as 
boundary spanning units, both marketing and sales have access to competitor and 
customer information that can be vital to the success of each department and the 
organization overall (Hult, 2011).  
The definitions of interface integration in previous literature are varied yet have 
basic tenets, including quality of cooperation, frictionless collaboration, and a unity of 
efforts toward a coordinated goal (Homburg et al., 2007).  Research by Rouziès et al. 
(2005) defines interface integration as the supportive coordination of the sales and 
marketing functions such that the activities complement each other and facilitate goal 





integration as the extent to which there is a state of collaboration between marketing and 
sales that is characterized by unity of effort and harmony (Lawrence et al., 1986).    
Previous research has identified benefits of a strong marketing-sales interface, 
including perhaps the most obvious, the creation and maintenance of a market orientation 
(Le Meuneir-FitzHugh & Piercy, 2011).  Other research has shown that a strong cross-
functional interface positively affects satisfaction in working with other departments, 
project success and performance (Kahn & McDonough, 1997; Troilo, DeLuca, and 
Guenzi, 2009).  Importantly for this research, the benefits of cooperation within the 
marketing-sales interface during the strategy creation stage are positively related to 
successful strategy creation and implementation (Homburg et al., 2008; LeMeunier-
FitzHugh et al., 2011).  In contrast, inhibitors of a strong interface between marketing and 
sales include goal conflicts, unidimensional perspectives, and strong in-group identities 
(Dewsnap and Jobber, 2002; Menon et al., 1999; Ruekert et al., 1987).    
 The cross-functional literature suggests that collaboration between functions 
involves collectively creating, choosing, and implementing strategy such that 
departments work to achieve goals harmoniously under the firm’s unified vision with 
shared ideas and resources (Hughes, Le Bon, & Malshe, 2012).  Typically, however, the 
studies have been broad-based and not pinpointed the specific strategies that need to be 
aligned, the conditions under which strategy misalignment may be masked, or the 
ramifications of strategy misalignment that may ripple throughout the organization.  
Marketing and sales strategy 
 Varadarajan (2010) places strategic marketing at the firm level. It involves, 





the business level, marketing strategy involves an integration of choices and activities 
pertaining to products and markets and the utilization of marketing resources for the 
creation, communication, and delivery of value to customers (Varadarajan, 2010).  Thus, 
marketing strategy goals are focused on the business unit but achievement of unit goals 
also benefits the firm (Varadarajan, 2010).   
The concept of alignment of strategies used in this research bridges the 
Varadarajan (2010) definition of marketing strategy with a definition representing the 
marketing-sales interface integration proposed by Kahn et al. (1997).  The goal of each 
strategy, which is a unified vision (Kahn et al., 1997), must be clearly communicated to 
facilitate alignment between marketing and sales.  Therefore, the alignment of marketing 
and sales strategies involves planning, creating, choosing, and implementing activities 
and resources such that these efforts are in concert and become focused on the same goal.   
Communication 
Factors that contribute to marketing-sales interface integration include both 
formal and informal communication and the efficient flow of information (Dewsnap et 
al., 2000; Fisher & Maltz, 1997; Ruekert et al., 1987).   The sales force is expected to 
collect information regarding customer requirements, competitive pricing, and other 
competitive activities (Cross et al., 2001; Dewsnap & Jobber, 2000).  Some shared 
information from marketing to sales would include the competitive analysis of products, 
packaging features and benefits, and changes in pricing strategies (Rouziès et al., 2005). 
Caution is warranted with regard to arbitrarily increasing communication to the point of 
counterproductive overload, with the result being decreased integration (Maltz et al., 





integrated marketing communications, and coordination of marketing mix activities, is 
aimed at improving outward communication to the customer, but largely ignores the 
internal sales force.  But efficient and effective bidirectional communication is crucial 
during the strategy creation and implementation stages to avoid conflicts of outcomes and 
goals. Thus, communication in and of itself is insufficient. Instead, communication must 
occur about the “right” elements of strategy.       
Pricing Strategy 
Pricing strategy is a marketing strategy (Varadarajan, 2010).  The communication 
and signaling of an organization’s pricing strategy affects the distribution channel, which 
includes competitors and customers, as well as the internal sales force. However, the 
effects of pricing strategy on the sales force have been established only anecdotally 
(Lancioni et al., 1993; Strahle et al., 1996).  Competitive market response to a pricing 
communication or signal may be retaliatory behavior involving a price war, or 
cooperative behavior in which the competitor raises prices to the new established referent 
price (Ramaswamy, Gatignon, & Reibstein, 1994; Palazon and Delgado-Ballester, 2009; 
Gu, Kim, Tse, & Wang, 2010).   
Considerable literature focuses on customer responses to a pricing strategy.  Some 
examples of these responses include changes in perceptions of value (Munnukka, 2006; 
Sharma & Iyer, 2011), in perceptions of quality (Tellis, 1986; Jacobs, Ratliff, and Smith, 
2010), and in demand (switching) (Holden & Nagle, 1998).   An important contribution 
of this domain of literature is the awareness that the price of an item “enters either as an 
attribute in the evaluation stage of the choice process or as a constraint in the ultimate 





consumer choice strategies (Tellis & Gaeth, 1990).   Moreover, price is also underlined in 
high quality brand choice strategy as consumers continue to maximize value by 
evaluating the quality against the price paid.   
In general, the typical pricing strategy has a long-term orientation and requires 
periodic choices between maximizing profit margins and increasing/protecting market 
share (Lancioni et al., 1993; Rao, 1984; Tellis, 1986).  To increase market share, 
companies may choose the fast approach of buying market share through deeply 
discounting the price, or the slower approach of gaining and holding market share by 
adding value or service at no additional charge to the customer (Lancioni et al., 1993).  
Regardless of the approach, growing market share represents a trade-off against 
maximizing profit margins.  
On the other hand, a pricing objective of profit maximization includes activities 
that focus on identifying the market price or the highest price the customer is willing to 
pay, and then establishing and maintaining that price level (Nagle, 1983; Nagle & Hogan, 
2007).   With a profit maximizing approach, a company typically identifies similar 
customer groups and offers levels of pricing based on transparent customer buying 
thresholds (Nagle, 1983; Nagle & Cressman Jr, 2002).  
Pricing and the Sales Force 
          When the domains of pricing and sales force behavior have been connected, it has 
been through the choice of whether an organization should centralize pricing decisions or 
delegate those decisions to the sales force (Lal, 1986; Stephenson, Cron, & Frazier, 1979; 
Weinberg, 1975).  However, the norm within the literature is that the goals of the pricing 





determining the degree to which prices may be negotiated (Lal, 1986; Mishra & Prasad, 
2004, 2005).    
The price delegation literature assumes the firm has a profit maximizing goal, and 
in order to award any authority, the sales force must be compensated on realized gross 
margins to ward off any suboptimal trade-off between effort and price (Joseph, 2001; 
Weinberg, 1975).  Prior literature has suggested that the information asymmetry concern 
on which the delegation decision was founded may be resolved through effective 
contracts between the sales force and the firm, thereby negating the need for a delegation 
decision (Hansen, Joseph, & Krafft, 2008; Mishra et al., 2004, 2005; Stephenson et al., 
1979).  Although the price delegation literature explores relevant managerial issues and 
offers an initial connection between pricing and the sales force, to date the domain has 
neglected addressing pricing strategy as a marketing strategy with multiple business unit 
level components and ramifications.  Further, the price delegation literature deems only 
one sales force compensation method to be optimal, and does not consider the multiple 
possible objectives of the sales force compensation strategy.  
Sales Force Management  
 
 The sales force management literature focuses on ways to improve sales force 
performance by identifying a series of activities that are involved in the selling process 
(Churchill, Ford, Hartley, & Walker, 1985; Walker, Churchill, & Ford, 1977; Weitz, 
Sujan, & Sujan, 1987).  In the seminal research by Walker et al. (1977), the authors used 
Vroom’s expectancy theory to explore the determinants of salesperson performance 
(Oliver, 1974; Vroom, 1964). The findings of Walker et al. (1977) suggest that the link 





perceived link between performance and reward (outcome-instrumentality) are 
antecedents to salesperson motivation (DeCarlo, Teas, & McElroy, 1997).  Sales force 
motivation is an antecedent to salesperson performance (Oliver, 1974; Tyagi, 1982).  The 
elements found to influence sales force effort, motivation, and therefore performance, 
include characteristics of the organizational context and characteristics of the control 
system of which compensation is a part.  
Organizational Characteristics 
 The organizational context variables that can affect sales force motivation and 
performance include management practices and policies (Walker, Jr, & Ford, 1977).  The 
responsibilities of and expectations for a salesperson should be clearly communicated 
through management practices and policies (Churchill, Ford, Hartley, & Walker, 1985; 
Teas, 1981).  Typically, the objectives and expectations of the sales force compensation 
strategy are well communicated to the sales force.  Clearly communicating the 
company’s pricing policies and expectations to the sales force may seem intuitive 
however the challenges of creating a pricing policy given product or service cost 
characteristics, communicating the price to the market, watching for market responses, 
and monitoring the outcomes (profit maximization or market share growth) are the 
principal foci of pricing literature and pricing professionals (Anderson, Wouters, & van 
Rossum, 2010; Dolan, 1987; Feldman, 2005; Tellis, 1986; Voss, Parasuraman, & Grewal, 
1998).  Nagle et al. (2002) make the case that although inconsistent pricing decisions 
occur in order to resolve short-term issues they also produce long term repercussions that 
include “conflict not only within the firm, but also between the firm and customers who 





detrimental to sales force motivation.  Setting high expectations will manifest perceptions 
of conflict when those expectations are not met (Maltz & Kohli, 2000).  Intentional 
miscommunication between marketing and sales regarding product strategies has been 
noted in previous research.  For example, Strahle, Spiro, and Acito (1996) note, “Several 
marketing executives admitted misleading their sales managers about products to keep 
them pushing volume” (p. 14).   This research suggests that the lack of clearly 
communicated pricing strategy expectations is an indicator that the pricing and sales 
force compensation strategies may be misaligned.   
  Central to expectations is how a salesperson perceives his/her role. Role 
perception, as described in (Walker, et al., 1977), “includes role accuracy, perceived role 
ambiguity, and perceived role conflict; all three variables are related to the salesperson’s 
perceptions of his role partners’ expectations and demands” (p. 159).  The lack of clarity 
regarding job expectations and the criteria on which performance is evaluated contribute 
to a salesperson’s role ambiguity (Miles & Perreault Jr, 1976).  Misaligned pricing and 
sales force compensation strategies are a source of negative role perceptions for the sales 
force.   
 Role accuracy, as defined by Walker et al. (1977) pertains to the quality and 
precision with which the salesperson understands the demands expected of them by the 
supervisors.  Perceived role ambiguity occurs when a salesperson feels information 
asymmetry is constraining her/his ability to adequately meet performance expectations. 
Role ambiguity is associated with confusion and uncertainty for the salesperson (Walker 
et al., 1997) and it is negatively related to the salesperson’s effort instrumentality (Singh, 





force role conflict, role ambiguity, and role overload influence job tension, turnover 
intentions, and performance. In situations of high role ambiguity, as when the strategies 
are not aligned, the salespeople get mixed messages as to what activities, behaviors, and 
job tasks will be most effective in accomplishing performance goals (Jaworski & Kohl, 
1991). Moreover, the salesperson is confused as to the hierarchy of expectations, how 
expectations should be met, and what criteria will be used to evaluate performance 
(Walker, et al., 1977).    
Research by Pritchard and Sanders (1973) found that role perceptions, external 
constraints, and ability to accomplish objectives contribute to the salesperson’s 
perceptions that an increase in effort would not increase performance.  In some instances, 
the salesperson may perceive the effort required to positively affect performance to be so 
high that it is beyond his or her capacity.  
A salesperson perceives a conflict with their role when they are required to meet 
multiple concurrent but incongruous demands (Churchill, Ford, & Walker, 1976; Tyagi, 
1982; Walker, 1977).  The boundary spanning role of the sales force significantly 
contributes to perceived role conflict as the salesperson is trying to satisfy both their 
external customer and internal managers (Evans, Margheim, & Schlacter, 1982).  
Perceived role conflict has been found to reduce salesperson confidence and his or her 
ability to meet expectations, although did not significantly influence salesperson 
motivation (Churchill et al., 1976; Evans et al., 1982).    
Role conflict can be resolved and behavior predictability increased when 
managers unify strategy goals and operational activities (Menon et el., 1999).  In agency 





compensation contracts (Eisenhardt, 1988). In general, strategies that are not aligned with 
the sales force compensation strategy contribute to increased perceived risk, uncertainty, 
and role conflict for the salesperson. Because of the high informational content of pricing 
strategies and the fact that pricing is a key selling tool, it is possible that the misalignment 
of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies in particular will be a significant 
contributor to salespersons’ role conflict, and ultimately a detrimental influence on their 
perception of required effort. However, these specific relationships have not been 
explored in the literature. This dissertation will examine these relationships and further 
propose that aligning the pricing and sales force compensation strategies toward 
congruent goals will positively influence the salesperson’s perception of effort, 
instrumentality, and motivation.    
Sales Force Control Systems 
 Agency theory is the foundation of much of the sales force control systems 
research that focuses on improving sales force performance (Anderson & Oliver, 1987; 
Shipley & Jobber, 1991; Misra, Coughlan, & Narasimhan, 2005; Hoskisson, Castleton, 
and Withers, 2009).   A control system, as defined by Anderson et al. (1987),  “is an 
organization’s set of procedures for monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating 
employees” (p. 76). In an effort to improve firm performance, the goals of the sales force 
compensation strategy are typically related to the firm’s objectives (Coughlan & Sen, 
1989).  The organization’s control systems are designed to solve two issues at the heart of 
agency theory: the difficulty in monitoring sales force behavior and the need to mitigate 





 Research by Anderson et al. (1987) classifies sales force control systems into 
outcome-based and behavioral-based systems.  Outcome-based control systems consist of 
commission-based compensation tied to performance quotas that are aligned with the 
firm’s performance objectives (Anderson et al., 1987).  The benefits to the organization 
of an outcome-based control system include transferring risk from the organization to the 
sales force and reducing the managerial resources needed to measure sales force inputs 
(Anderson et al., 1987; John & Weitz, 1989; Lo, Ghosh, and LaFontaine, 2011).  
However, the relatively low levels of direct managerial control featured in outcome-based 
control systems may increase salespersons’ role ambiguity and exacerbate his or her 
perceptions of the transferred risk, resulting in an increase in stress and turnover 
intentions (Singh, 1998).   
 The characteristics of the behavior-based control system include a salary-based 
compensation and the infrastructure for monitoring and controlling sales force inputs 
(Anderson et al., 1987; Piercy, Cravens, and Lane, 2012).  One benefit to the organization 
of a behavior-based control system is increased managerial control, or the ease with 
which the organization can direct the sales force to “perform certain behaviors as part of 
the company strategy without the necessity of convincing each salesperson that the 
strategy is valid” (Anderson et al., 1987, p. 78).     
 The more comprehensive the behavior-based compensation program the more 
likely the manager will measure performance only on a limited amount of qualitative 
criteria (Anderson et al., 1987).  Performance evaluations of behavior-based 
compensation programs are based on subjective ratings of the sales manager, which may 





The successful execution and evaluation of the company’s pricing strategy depends upon 
the behaviors and performance of the sales manager and sales force (Lancioni et al., 
1993).  Again, given the high informational content of the pricing strategy and the 
importance of price as an instrument of sales, it is interesting to note that the sales force 
performance literature has not explored how the organization’s pricing strategy 
influences the salesperson’s perception of risk.  This study will explore the extent to 
which the alignment of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies toward 




















CHAPTER 2 (ESSAY 1) 
EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF PRICING ON THE SALES FORCE AND THE 
FIRM: THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF STRATEGIC MISALIGNMENT 
ABSTRACT 
 
While the marketing strategy implementation literature suggests that collaboration 
between the marketing and sales areas may ensure successful implementation of a firm’s 
strategy (Malshe & Sohi, 2009), pricing and sales force compensation strategies have not 
been directly linked together in a research study. Pricing and compensation have been 
identified separately as possible problem domains for agency issues where the principal 
and the agent have different goals and risk preferences (Eisenhardt, 1989) and areas 
representing conflict for top management teams (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). When 
pricing and the sales force have been examined together, it has been to answer the 
question: “Under what compensation system is it appropriate for a salesman to have 
control over price?” (Weinberg, 1975, p. 937). However, the pricing delegation literature 
does not address marketing components such as product and promotion management of 
which pricing is a key element.   This study fills a void in marketing literature by 





pricing and sales force compensation strategies in relation to the salesperson, the 
marketing-sales interface, and the performance of the firm.   
This research originated from a real-world problem that businesses regularly face.  
The problem setting referenced in Chapter 1 occurred in a Fortune-250 B2B company.  
The reasons for the failed marketing strategy were misattributed to other causes, and the 
firm did not look to the misalignment of goals as a potential source of the problem. The 
pricing and sales force compensation strategies are the two revenue generating strategies 
for a company.  While it would seem logical for managers to align the goals of these two 
strategies, the reality is that organizations are often outward focused and reacting to 
changes in the structure of the industry. The challenge for managers is to develop an in-
house concentration where goal alignment is deliberate, and the benefit of goal alignment 
is improvement in firm performance. 
  Misalignment of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies can affect 
the sales force by creating ambiguous roles for the sales force as they experience 
confusion and uncertainty as to which activities are actually required to meet 
performance expectations.  Multiple concurrent goals can create a conflict in roles for the 
salesperson trying to satisfy the external customer as well as the internal customer, the 
marketing and sales managers (Miles & Perreault Jr, 1976).  Conflicting goals increase 
the salesperson’s perception of risk.  In an attempt to achieve a multitude of goal 
expectations the salesperson may, therefore, lose sight of the preferred role and goal of 
the selling organization.   The purpose of this essay is to explore the existence and 








As the nature of this research is exploratory, given the lack of literature on pricing 
and sales force compensation goal alignment, a qualitative, grounded theory approach 
was appropriate (Flint, Woodruff, & Gardial, 2002).  A qualitative data collection method 
of in-depth interviews is appropriate for obtaining a first-hand (key informant) account of 
a phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).  The phenomenon of interest in this dissertation 
is the effects of misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies. 
Through the process of inductive reasoning, this research develops an understanding of 
how misaligned goals negatively affect salesperson behavior, the sales force, and 
organizational resources and communication. “Inductive reasoning is a type of thinking 
that involves identifying patterns in a data set to reach conclusions and build theories” 
(Hair Jr., Celsi, Money, Samouel, & Page, 2011, p. 276).  The literature by Strauss et al. 
(1990) establishes the primary criteria for the grounded theory approach guiding this 
research.  The criteria include an explanation of how and why the sample was chosen, 
how the theoretical formulations guided the evolution of the protocol and data collection, 
and how predominant and representative the concepts were.    
Sample 
The purposive (judgment) sample chosen for this research is the B2B sales 
professional. A purposive sample is one representing elements unique to the research 
interest and “are chosen because the researcher believes they represent the target 
population, but they are not necessarily representative,” (Hair Jr., et al., 2011, p. 175).  
This sample was chosen in a deliberate and non-random manner. The B2B sales manager 





policies to their customers and achieving sales force compensation goals.  Elements 
unique to the sample in this research include: 1) sales professionals who were responsible 
for a range of customers, not just one key account, and 2) the salespeople who were 
responsible for administering the firm’s pricing strategy yet had limited pricing authority 
(with upper management approval only).  The total sample of 15 sales professionals 
included seven sales managers and eight salespeople.  There was one instance in which 
the salesperson and his/her manager were both interviewed.  Table 1.1 details the sample 
used in this dissertation.  The details of the two phases of data collection are to follow in 
the data collection section (Phase One = 8 interviewees and Phase Two = 7 interviewees).  
Table 1.1.  B2B sales professional  
 
  Count   
Objective (n=15)         Percentage 
Job Title 
  Sales Manager 7 46.70% 
Salesperson 8 53.30% 
Sales Experience 
  < 5 years 1 6.70% 
6-10 years 2 13.30% 
11-15 years 1 6.70% 
> 16 years 11 73.30% 
Current Job Experience 
  < 5 years 12 80.00% 
6-10 years 1 6.70% 
11-15 years 0 0.00% 
> 16 years 2 13.30% 
Commission Compensation 
 0% 2 13.30% 
1-5% 7 46.60% 
6-25% 3 20.00% 
26-50% 1 6.70% 
51-75% 0 0.00% 









(pricing & sales force 
compensation) 
 
 yes 7 46.70% 
no 8 53.30% 
Gender 
  Female 5 33.30% 
Male 10 66.70% 
 
Overall, this group of sales professionals had many years (Mean = 21 years) of 
sales experience, however relatively few years (Mean = 4.7 years) of experience with 
their current employer.  Only one salesperson in the sample had 0-5 years of experience 
in the sales profession.  There were two individuals (13.3%) who had 6-10 years of sales 
experience.  One individual (6.7%) had 11-15 years sales experience.  The majority, 11 
(73.3%) of the sales professionals had greater than 16 years of experience.  Experience 
with the current employer yielded differing results with 12 sales professionals (80%) 
working for their current employer for 0-5 years.  There was one individual who had 6-10 
years of tenure with their current company.  Only two sales managers had greater than 16 
years of experience with the current employer.  The majority (66.7%) of sales 
professionals were males. 
When the sales managers recounted the percent of annual salary that is 
commission for the sales force they did so from a company perspective by reporting on 
how the sales force in general is compensated. The salespeople interviewed reported their 
individual percent of annual salary that is commission. To avoid confusion, all of the 
commission percentages are reported from a company perspective.  There were two 





majority (46.7%) of companies, commission comprised 1% to 5% of annual salary for the 
sales force. The percent of annual salary that is commission ranged from 6% to 25% for 
three (20.0%) of the companies that participated in this study. One sales organization 
(6.7%) offered commission between 26% and 50% of annual compensation.  
Commission percentages ranging from 76% to 100% occurred in only two (13.3%) sales 
organizations. 
Interestingly, when the sales professionals were asked “Have you ever faced a 
situation in which the way the company priced and promoted its products did not match 
with your [your sales force’s] incentive/compensation structure?” the responses were 
“yes” from seven (46.7%) sales professionals and “no” from eight (53.3%) sales 
professionals. The response to the misalignment question differed in the interview with 
the sales manager and the direct report at the same company. The salesperson stated, 
“Yes.” The sales manager replied, “No.”  The sales manager did concede that the pricing 
strategies for some products, relative to how the salesperson is paid, meant that the 
salesperson “needs to go out and work harder.”  
Context 
The context of this study is companies in B2B markets.  Manufacturing or 
industrial sales and sales to wholesalers are subsets of B2B markets. Research by Weitz 
(1978) states “Industrial sales situations are characterized by a relatively high level of 
involvement by both the salesperson and customer and a continuing relationship between 
both parties of the interaction” (p. 514).  The sales professionals interviewed for this 
research sell in B2B markets and include both industrial sales and sales to wholesalers.  





volume orders, downward pressures on price, and a trend towards the commoditization of 
products (Draganska, Klapper, & Villas-Boas, 2010; Kopalle et al., 2009). The sales 
professional’s role in B2B markets is critical to the success of the selling organization.  
Data Collection 
 
Prior to the pilot interviews, roundtable discussions with salespeople were 
conducted to confirm the nuances of the selling environment, as well as the nomenclature 
of the interview protocol. Once the initial interview protocol was established, the data 
collection began.  Data collection was completed in two phases. The first phase involved 
a pilot study with sales managers and salespeople from several industries (insurance and 
financial services, automotive aftermarket, B2B consumer electronics, and recreational 
sports equipment).  The target sample size for this phase was eight interviews: four sales 
managers and four salespeople. Research by Guest, Bunce & Johnson (2006) suggests 
that when using a purposive and relatively homogeneous sample that six to twelve 
interviews can provide quality information. The eight transcribed interviews for the pilot 
phase provided saturation on occurrences of misaligned goals and unique effects on the 
sales force and the organization. A further discussion of the findings is addressed in the 
analysis section.  
Telephone interviews lasting forty-five minutes to one hour were held with each 
salesperson or sales manager.  The sales professionals were asked a series of questions 
about how their company established prices and how their sales compensation package 
was constructed (the protocol is provided in Appendix A). A series of open-ended 
questions were asked to elicit possible misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales 





whether and how misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales compensation 
strategies may occur, and 2) to refine the interview protocol.  
The pilot interviews began in November of 2011 and were finished in December 
of 2011.  A review of each audio file was done while the files were being professionally 
transcribed.  Once the transcribed files were completed the text files were read while 
listening to the audio files to ensure transcription accuracy. The pilot interviews were 
coded and segregated into the key concepts. The protocol was continually refined to 
facilitate specificity, range and definition of each concept (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). 
Phase Two interviews began in July of 2012 and finished in February of 2013.  
The target sample size for Phase Two was a total of seven interviews: three sales 
managers and four salespeople. Saturation of the data continued in Phase Two.  The 
protocol did not change after September 2012.   
Interview Protocol 
In-depth interviews with semi-structured protocols are especially useful in 
uncovering complex processes, and provide a degree of relevancy to the topics under 
investigation (Bartholomew, 2000). In the B2B marketing literature, in-depth interviews 
have been used effectively in contexts in which limited research has been conducted 
(Flint, Woodruff, & Gardial, 2002; Madhavan & Grover, 1998; Tuli, Kohli, & 
Bharadwaj, 2007; Ulaga & Eggert, 2006).  Importantly, the semi-structured interview 
protocol affords greater flexibility to prompt and probe into a given situation 
(Bartholomew et al., 2000). Since this dissertation explores the complex sources of 





implications of this misalignment, the use of a structured, in-depth-interview approach is 
especially well suited to the context.   
The goals of the interviews were to identify a) sources of incongruent goals of the 
pricing and sales force compensation strategies within organizations, b) behaviors of 
salespeople that result when the goals were incongruent, c) inefficient use of 
organizational resources, and d) ineffective communication as a result of incongruent 
goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies.   
Corbin & Strauss (2008) state that “The original question in a qualitative study is 
often broad and open-ended. It tends to become more refined and specific as the research 
progresses and the issues and problems of the area under investigation are defined” (p. 
41).  The specificity and range of these concepts was enhanced with changes to the 
protocol.  For example, in the initial protocol, the question used to identify the 
motivational influence of a firm’s pricing strategy was “Can you tell me about a time 
when you felt any more or less motivated to sell/perform by price structure, price 
changes, or other things out of your control?” In the first interview, the response from the 
sales professional confirmed a situation where the selling company changed brands of a 
product and increased their selling price to the market by 20 percent.   
The sales manager, TW13 stated, “It was a tough sell for the salespeople 
because it was such an increase in cost to the customer and the 
salespeople could not envision [the customer paying that much for this 
new brand].” The sales manager went on to say, for him “It was a hard 
struggle to educate the sales force and the customer as to why the price of 
this new brand of product was increased so much higher than the 
originally offered brand of product.”     
 
After this interview, the original question in the protocol was followed with a 





product pricing, how does price affect the amount of customer satisfaction you have 
established [your sales force has] to sell a product successfully?”  In addition, a question 
was added to inductively probe for situations where the salesperson’s perceived risk of 
being unsuccessful was affected as a result of a pricing strategy.  The extended question 
was framed as “In general, how does your organization’s pricing approach affect your 
[your sales force’s] ability to sell effectively? Does it cost you sales/customer 
satisfaction? <Probe for either positively or negatively. Probe for examples of 
salesperson risk or perceived effort.>.”  In Appendix A, the original protocol is 
displayed in regular text and the changes are listed in bold, italicized text.  
In accordance with a grounded theory approach, this dissertation “should help the 
reader to assess some of the components that emerged from the actual research process” 
(Corbin & Strauss, 1990, p. 16).    Table 1.2 illustrates the codebook that was created 
using an iterative process as suggested by Guest et al. (2006).  In this process, each code 
has four parts: 1) a full definition that explains the concept; 2) a “when to use” section 
that gives instances, based on the data, of how to identify the concept; 3) a sample of a 
quote extracted from the data representing the concept; and 4) respondent interviews that 
have occurrences of this specific concept.   
Interrater Reliability 
After the interviews were conducted and transcribed, two judges worked 
independently to code a random subset of the transcripts for common themes. The coders 
then discussed the major themes and defined each theme based upon mutual agreement. 
The judges then independently coded each transcript for the presence of the main themes. 





was assessed using the established procedures of Rust and Cooil (1994). The resulting 
interrater reliability score was .89, exceeding the .70 threshold for acceptable reliability.  





Table 1.2. Illustration of codebook used for interviews
Concept Definition When to use Sample of coded item
Respondents with 
occurences of the 
concept
Misaligned goals
The goal of the pricing strategy 
(either profit maximization or 
market share growth) is 
incongruent with the goal of the 
sales force compensation 
strategy (either profit 
maximization or market share 
growth). 
Two different goals for the pricing and 
sales force strategies exist. Code 
associated with this concept: Goal 
conflict. 
 "Unfortunately, it’s more to the 
customer’s benefit because in this market 
we’re always being pushed down on 
price. I like my prices to be high and I like 
the margin to be there [where I need it] ." 
(KB6)
EJM4, KB6,MR7, 
MQ8, PS9, SD11, 
TE12, TW13, TA14,
Adverse selling 
behaviors of the 
salespeople 
The negative activities that 
salespeople conduct during the 
selling process.
When the sales professional engages in a 
tactic or activity during the selling process.  
Examples include: planning, not performing 
job responsibilities, and gaming the system. 
Codes associated with this concept: 
effect of pricing on sales performance, 
multiple goals, offsetting noncompetitive 
prices with other resources, customer 
relationship building, and sales person role 
conflict.  
 "If the product sales amount was too 
small, even though it is new business, I 
don’t get compensated… I am not 
motivated to sell that product. " (DL3)
BR1, CS2, DL3, 
EJM4, JG5, 
KB6,MR7, MQ8, PS9, 
RS10, SD11, TE12, 
TW13, TA14, WW15 
Sales force 
perceived effort to 
be successful
The salesperson's anticipated 
amount of cognitive and physical 
energy and time required for a 
job task. 
When the sales professional suggests that 
his/her effort has been or will need to be 
increased or decreased. Codes 
associated with this concept:  effort, 
motivation, sales effort (perceived), sales 
force performance, sales person role 
conflict, sales professional helplessness no 
control, trust.
"This situation requires a great deal more 
effort on the part of the sales manager, to 
educate the sales force, and for the sales 
force to educate the customers on why 
they should buy this new brand and pay 
more." (TW13)
BR1, CS2, DL3,JG5,  
EJM4, KB6, MR7, 
MQ8,  PS9, RS10, 
SD11, TE12, TW13, 
TA14, WW15
Perceived risk of 
being unsuccessful
The perceived degree of 
relationship a person sees 
between his/her actions and 
liklihood of not achieving the 
desired outcome.  
When the sales professional perceives that 
their ability to perform and achieve the 
desired level of accomplishment has been 
compromised. Codes associated with 
this concept:  instrumentality, perceived 
risk- ability to be competitive, perceived 
risk of achieving a goal, price adjustments, 
sales force performance, organizational 
resources
"Even with 90 percent of market share 
you still have to be careful with pricing.  
If you open the door for your competitors 
to come in, you will be screwed. You will 
lose customers [and everything else] and 
then you will regret having administered 
the price increase ." (SD11)
BR1,CS2, DL3, EJM4,  
JG5, KB6, MR7, 
MQ8, PS9, RS10, 






Table 1.2 continued 
 
Key Emergent Concepts 
 
The following seven concepts emerged from the data as being affected by 
misaligned pricing and sales force compensation goals:  
 selling behaviors of the sales force; 
 perceived effort by the salesperson; 
 perceived risk of being unsuccessful; 
 cost of monitoring sales force outcomes; 
Table 1.2 Continued . Illustration of codebook used for interviews
Concept Definition When to use Sample of coded item
Respondents with 
occurences of the 
concept
Cost to monitor 
sales force 
outcomes
The use of resources as they 
relate to managing, monitoring, 
or evaluating sales force tactics, 
activities, and outcomes. . 
When the sales professional indicates a 
monitoring, reporting or evaluative process.  
These included both planned and 
unplanned. Codes associated with this 
concept: cost of monitoring sales, 
monitoring sales, promotion non-price 
related, sales person perk 
"The computer will not let the salesperson 
enter an order or sell something cheaper 
than the established price.  The 
salesperson has to get a manager to sign 
off on something like that; especially, if 
you are trying to do a favor for a 
customer [that is on a higher price 
level] ." (TW13)
BR1, CS2, DL3, 
EJM4, LG5, KB6, 
MR7, MQ8, PS9, 
RS10, SD11, TE12, 




The inefficient and unauthorized 
use of organizational resources, 
and loss of tangible and 
intangible resources.
When the sales professional indicates an 
inefficient or unauthorized distribution of an 
organizational resource. Codes 
associated with this concept:  offsetting 
noncompetitive prices with other resources
"A salesman who is paid commission to 
sell volume, has a product that’s high-
priced and to try to get a customer to buy 
at the higher price, they throw in free 
freight or they throw in terms, or they 
scrounge around and find something 
throw in to offset the high price.  It 
happens every day. " (WW15)
BR1,CS2, JG5, KB6, 
MR7, MQ8, PS9, 





Quality of communication is the 
interpersonal, transactional, 
symbolic process by which 
individuals achieve and maintain 
understanding.
When the sales professional represents the 
selling organization in a message.  When an 
organization communicates to the market. 
When the quality of communication 
between the sales and marketing 
departments is mentioned.   Codes 
associated with this concept:  Customer 
relationship building, external 
communication, goal conflict, internal 
communication, organizational 
communcation
"A couple of years ago, when I was with 
my other company, we had price changes 
three or four times a year.  It was really 
uncomfortable to call the customer to tell 
them, “Guess what, we are going to 
change the prices, AGAIN .” (PS9)
BR1, CS2, DL3, JG5, 
KB6, MR7, MQ8, 
PS9, RS10, SD11, 






The inter-dependence and 
relational environment between 
the marketing and sales 
functional areas. 
When the respondent mentions the 
marketing department or pricing manager.  
(Can be positive or negative connotation.)  
Codes associated with this concept: 
interface between marketing and sales and 
marketing and sales dept. conflict.
"Initially the marketing department was 
separate from the sales department.  
There were some very clear disconnects 
when marketing and sales weren’t 
working close together.  There were 
missteps in the promotion and more 
importantly, a lack of sales support out of 
the marketing department ." (BR1)
BR1, CS2, DL3, 
EJM4, KB6, MR7, 
MQ8, PS9, RS10, 






 use of organizational resources; 
 quality of organizational communication; 
 inter-functional relationship between marketing and sales. 
 
In this section, each of the seven concepts will be explained. Then a series of 
propositions will be developed focusing on the relationship between each of the emerging 
concepts and the misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies.  
The concept of goal misalignment originated out of a phenomenon experienced 
by the author.  Despite the fact that the author had a working understanding of the goals 
of both the pricing and sales force compensation strategies, confirmation of the ubiquity 
of these goals in B2B markets was required.   Conversations with salespeople prior to the 
pilot interviews confirmed that the goals of both the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies generally were focused to either maximize profit or grow market share.    
Throughout the interviews, when prompted to focus on one product group or product 
line, the goal of the pricing strategy was communicated as either profit or “the high-end”, 
or market share growth or “the low-end.”   All of the sales professionals interviewed 
confirmed having either profit maximization or market share growth as a sales goal.  
Once these goals of profit maximization and market share growth were confirmed, the 
process of uncovering the concept of misalignment began.  
 The nature of goal misalignment and the seven concepts emerged from the data 
through described events, actions, and/or feelings from those interviewed.  The following 






Misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies occurred 
in approximately 50% of the companies represented by sales professionals interviewed 
for this study.   All of the sales professionals acknowledged the salesperson’s dependence 
on price as a tool. A sales manager (TE12) suggested “if anything they may use price as a 
crutch.”   This study suggests that when the goals are misaligned the organization is 
restraining the sales force from accomplishing the sales goal for which they are being 
compensated. As a sales manager (TW13) stated in reference to changes in pricing and 
the stationary market share growth target for his salespeople, 
One was different from the other.  It didn’t matter what they did with the 
pricing.  Your growth expectancy still remains.  They want you to grow 
20%-30% before you hit your bonus and it does not matter whether the 
pricing has changed during the year. 
 
During the interview process, the concept of having congruent goals for these two 
strategies seemed foreign to some and familiar to others.  Therefore, two approaches 
were used to identify if the company’s goals for their pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies were incongruent.  The first approach was to have the sales 
professional think about the goals of each strategy separately.  The sales professional was 
asked “Is your compensation based on profit margin goals or market share growth 
goals?” Later in the interview the sales professional responded to the following question, 
“Are the goals of the pricing strategies apparent or communicated to the sales force?”  
All individuals responded “yes” and communicated the specific goal of the pricing 
strategy.   When asked about the goals of these two strategies in a separate fashion, nine 
sales professionals (60.0%) indicated that the goals were incongruent with each other.  





situation in which the way the company priced and promoted its products did not match 
with your [your sales force’s] incentive/compensation structure?”, which yielded a 
response of seven (46.7%) sales professionals stating “yes”.  Several sales professionals 
recounted incidents they observed relating to other salespeople with regard to pricing 
acting as a constraint to sales performance.  As the interviews progressed the negative 
effects of misalignment were apparent on the sales force, the misuse of organizational 
resources, the quality of organizational communication, and the quality of the inter-
functional relationship between the marketing and sales functions. 
Adverse Selling Behaviors of the Sales Force 
When continually comparing the transcribed interviews, more refined concepts 
affected by the misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies 
emerged, such as adverse selling behaviors. Misaligned strategies may encourage 
salespeople to adversely adapt their selling behaviors.  For example, MQ8 is a 
salesperson who earns commission on market share growth while the pricing goal is 
admittedly based on profit.  When MQ8 perceives that the price of the product is too high 
for the customer, MQ8 offers the following,  
I work out a deal with the customer offering free freight or whatever 
provides the customer with more value. 
 
The salesperson who has access to resources within the selling organization will 
invest his/her time seeking ways to counteract the high selling prices. If adverse selling 
behaviors were on a continuum perhaps spending time “giving away profit” instead of 
making new sales would be on one end and on the opposite end would be abstaining from 





maximization, talked about refraining from selling products not priced high enough.  DL3 
reports,  
If the product total is a small value even though it is new business, I don’t 
get anything… I am not motivated to sell that product.  
 
Salesperson SD11 is compensated on market share growth yet his company prices 
the products SD11 sells with a profit maximization objective. SD11 sells to wholesalers. 
The company that SD11 sells for has a published price sheet however SD11 has found a 
way to circumvent the system.  In fact SD11 comments, 
You know, we are legitimate, we publish our pricing list and we stick to it. 
But then there are also pricing levels. Every company, whether they admit 
it or not, has multi-pricing levels.  The levels are contingent on the 
purchasing power [purchasing volume] the customer has.  If a company is 
just starting out, and I know this person and I know he is going to be good. 
I will help him out with a better pricing level.  
 
The Marketing department of SD11’s company has likely established pricing 
levels to reward companies that buy large volumes with lower prices in an effort to 
protect the margin opportunity in the resell channel. Typically these buying companies 
have significant overhead and demand large margins when pricing to their end customers.    
When SD11 offers the product to a start-up company (likely with less overhead than the 
large company) at the large volume customer price level it affords the start-up company 
the opportunity to undercut or “lowball” the large company’s selling price with the exact 
same product.  The long term ramifications of SD11’s behaviors will erode the referent 
price of the product in the end-user market, and the company’s large customer will 
become extremely angry. Meanwhile, SD11 is growing market share by opening start-up 






Perceived Effort to be Successful 
Effort is defined as the amount of cognitive and physical energy and time invested 
in a job task (Jaramillo & Mulki, 2008; Rangarajan, Jones, & Chin, 2005).  Perceived 
effort would then be the salesperson’s anticipated amount of cognitive and physical 
energy and time required for a task.  Organizations establish sales thresholds for the sales 
force and award outcome or behaviors with compensation. Sales management literature 
states that sales force control systems are thought to be able to direct efforts.   “Control 
systems have an impact on the salesperson’s thoughts and feelings and certain behaviors” 
(Oliver & Anderson, 1994, p. 60).   This study finds that indeed the pricing strategy 
influences a salesperson’s perceptions of the effort believed to be required to be 
successful. The pricing strategy in concert with the goal of the sales force compensation 
strategy enables the salesperson to evaluate and determine the effort needed and react 
accordingly.  Sales manager EJM4’s sales force is compensated on market share growth 
and the firm’s pricing strategy is profit maximization.  EJM4 commented on the various 
levels of sales force effort,  
When the sales force knows that the price of a product is hot and right 
[lowest in the market], they are in the field pushing and selling.  When the 
sales force knows that the price of a product is about the same as the 
competitors, that is how they treat it, just the same as everybody. When 
they know that the price of a product is too high, way out of line with the 
market, they will not even try to sell it.  
 
Sales manager TW13 remembers a situation where the selling company switched to a 
brand of product and priced the product 20% higher than the originally carried brand.  
The sales force, compensated on market share growth, perceived that it would take too 





This situation requires a great deal more effort on the part of the sales 
manager to educate the sales force, and for the sales force to educate the 
customers on why they should buy this new brand and pay more. 
 
Perceived Risk of Being Unsuccessful 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, risk is deliberately induced and transferred to and from 
the sales force and the company through sales force control systems. Outcome control 
systems require very little managerial involvement, include objective performance 
evaluations, are associated with pay for performance compensation methods, and as a 
result, transfer risk to the salesperson (Oliver, et al., 1994).  In contrast, behavioral 
control systems require extensive managerial involvement through monitoring, 
evaluation, and approval processes. Behavioral control systems are associated with a 
larger salary component of compensation whereby risk is maintained with the company 
(Oliver et. al., 1994). 
To understand how the concept of the salesperson’s perceived risk of being 
unsuccessful emerged from the data as an important concept in this study, sales manager 
TE12 stated, 
In the last two years, price has moved up to the number two or three top 
challenge [to overcome] as reported by the sales force.   
 
Sales manager TW13, whose team is compensated with a market share growth 
goal, speculates the reason for his/her organization’s high profit margin requirement on 
product pricing is the result of the organization’s low purchasing power.  This company 
must pay a higher price for the components, and may attempt to recoup the higher costs 
with a higher priced product. However, the resulting price was higher than the market 
referent price.  In response to management’s growth expectations (year over year, double 





There is always going to be somebody that is going to buy from you 
because it is convenient.  But when it comes down to fighting it out on the 
streets [for new market growth] unless the selling company has their costs 
under control, and can price the product competitively, you are not going 
to grow the business and you are not going to make it as a salesperson. 
 
 One of the sales managers interviewed explained that once a year, the salesperson 
and the manager sit down together and establish the bonus thresholds for the coming 
year.  The manager, TE12, stated,  
It is a team process with feedback.  It doesn’t do us any good to put 
unrealistic goals.  The salesperson knows the market better than anyone 
else. Admittedly, there is a fine line between sandbagging and setting 
goals way too high and that is the negotiation point. The salesperson and 
the sales manager agree on a goal that is motivating and not 
demotivating.  
 
Another concept that emerged from the interviews that is related to a 
salesperson’s perceived risk of being unsuccessful is a salesperson’s perception that 
he/she can be competitive selling the company’s product offering. The perception of 
being competitive is most relevant when the competition is intent on stealing business 
from the salesperson. The threat of losing a big customer as a result of pricing can put a 
salesperson’s sales goal and commission or bonus at risk. This occurs even with the 
salesperson participating in establishing the sales goal threshold.  Again, comments from 
sales manager TE12,  
We have a customer that is an $800 million distribution center.  Our 
salesperson is saying the customer is threating to leave.  If we want to 
keep the business we have to meet their new price demand.  The selling 
company produces original equipment quality parts and the large 
distributor is threatening to pull the business and go with an off-shore 
supplier whose selling price is 70% of our selling price. It caught the 






In this case, the actions of the selling company and the customer determine the 
salesperson’s reward outcome and the salesperson will likely perceive a high degree of 
risk in not achieving the sales goal, hence his/her bonus.   
One sales professional participating in this study expressed concerned with 
pricing although the company enjoys near monopoly in the market.  This salesperson still 
fears the competition coming in and eroding what the sales force has accumulated.  
Comments from salesperson SD11 (compensated on market share growth),  
Even with 90 percent of market share, you still have to be careful with 
pricing.  If you open the door for your competitors to come in, you will be 
screwed. You will lose customers [and everything else] and then you will 
regret having administered the price increase.   
  
 When the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies are 
misaligned the salesperson perceives a higher risk of being unsuccessful.  Perceived risk 
is very real to salespeople.  If performance goals are not met, the salesperson is out of a 
job.  Sales manager, BR1 confirms,  
I remember releasing salespeople that were not producing.  I let them go 
because I do not think they were working hard enough or perhaps they felt 
it was too difficult to sell and just didn’t produce. 
 
 Cost to Monitor Sales Force Outcomes 
 When an organization establishes the sales force compensation strategy, the 
resources for monitoring and systems for evaluating are also in place.  Moreover, the 
monitoring costs are anticipated. When goals are misaligned the frequency of failed goal 
attempts increases.  Organizations do not grow if the sales force is not achieving sales 
goals and salespeople do not remain in positions when sales goals are not met.  The 





extensions or exception-monitoring programs to accommodate the occurrences of failed 
sales goals. Salesperson SD11 who is compensated on market share growth noted,  
We get evaluated on a quarterly basis. If you hit your sales goal, you get 
commission. If you do not [hit your sales goal] you are in the hole for the 
next quarter review.  You have to make up the prior quarters negatives or 
deficits before you can earn commission. This continues throughout the 
year.  
 
 A profit maximization compensation strategy is associated with a behavioral 
control system that requires a great deal of managerial input, monitoring, feedback, and 
guidance.  Once the behavioral control systems are part of daily operation, it is 
cumbersome for an organization to manage a market share growth price promotion.  
Managers get conditioned to measure changes in specific matrices. A requirement of an 
effective sales force control system is that the sales force comprehends the parameters on 
which they are being evaluated. Behavioral control systems would likely measure profit 
margin growth and return on sales, which are completely different matrices than revenue 
market share and/or customer or market penetration.  In the problem setting referenced 
earlier, the organization, which compensates the sales force based on profit, tried to run a 
market share growth price promotion in a specific region.  The organization did not have 
standard reports in place that would show the incremental growth of sales in units per 
salesperson.  The results of the first month were not readily available to the salespeople. 
The organization enlisted the aid of an employee from the accounting department to 
create a report for the remaining two months of the promotion.  At the end of each month 
of the promotion, the managers met to discuss possible ways to positively influence the 





resources and created extra audit measures for the added delivery service.  This problem 
stemmed from misaligned goals. 
 A market share growth compensation strategy is associated with an outcome 
control system requiring minimal supervisory monitoring, evaluation, and input.  A sales 
force evaluated on outcomes, not behaviors that it takes to achieve these outcomes, 
performs his/her job duties with a high level of autonomy (Oliver & Anderson, 1994).  
The benefits of an autonomous sales force with a goal to grow market share are placed in 
double jeopardy when the challenge of misaligned pricing (profit maximization goal) is 
combined with an organizational restriction on who can change prices.  With sales goal 
achievement at risk, the members of the sales force will either continually appeal to their 
supervisor and/or other members of the management team for relief, or they will 
circumvent organizational procedures that manifest in misattributed loss of resources. 
Unplanned events in business cost managers time and detract from efficiencies and 
growth.  Salesperson MQ8 references the additional supervisory involvement needed 
when faced with a compensation goal of growing market share, but when forced to sell 
products with increasing prices,  
In searching for something to offset the higher prices for one particular 
order, I will go to my manager and explain the customer situation and ask 
if the manager will approve a five percent discount for the customer 
paying for the order cash in advance or a two or three percent discount if 
the customer pays in ten days.  I am not empowered to authorize these 
things.    
 
Sales manager TW13 comments,  
The computer will not let the salesperson enter an order or sell something 
cheaper than the established price.  The salesperson has to get a manager 
to sign off on something like that, especially if you are trying to do a favor 






Sales manager TE12 discusses the process that his company goes through when a 
salesperson requests lower than listed prices,  
When the salesperson comes to management and says, “We need a 10 to 
15 percent price reduction on this part to continue our sales volume with 
this customer and here is what is going on,” management gets together 
and determines if we can do this or not.  If we can’t, then we try to buy a 
couple of days, or weeks to get our purchasing and procurement guys 
involved and say, “Listen, we have to get a better price.” 
 
One of the most proximal drains on organizational resources is an increase in costs to 
monitor and manage the sales force. This drain increases with misaligned goals of the 
pricing and sales force compensation strategies.  
 An organization that has aligned goals for the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies has processes and systems in place that are conducive to the flow 
of information throughout management.  A sales manager (CS2) who is in an 
environment in which the pricing and sales force compensation goals are both market 
share elaborates,   
We have an automated process called the SPAR process, Special Price 
Authorization Request.  The form asks the salesperson to key in responses 
to basic questions that management would want to view.  For instance, 
who is the competition, what is the competitive price, what is it the 
competitors are offering and for how long.  As the sales manager, I have 
authorization to deviate from the published price and offer a discount.  All 
of the details are in the computer system and everything is done up front.   
 
Organizational Resources 
 This research is specifically concerned with the inefficient and unauthorized use 
of organizational resources that may result from misaligned goals.  Resources at risk of 
being commandeered are those that do not impact the sales force compensation or the 





resources are often undetected or erroneously misattributed to conditions other than the 
misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies.  A salesperson 
compensated on market share growth may misappropriate organizational resources if it 
results in growing his/her territories market share.   Sales manager TW13 makes the point 
about such a situation,  
If your prices are not that great [compared to competition], and you want 
to win the sale, we have told customers that we will deliver to them [free] 
four and five times a day whereas the competition will only come twice. 
 
 Opening new accounts and securing new business is a responsibility of the sales 
force.  Salesperson MR7 is compensated on market share growth and is expected to open 
new accounts and secure new business.  When a salesperson spends nearly half of his/her 
time in pricing negotiations with customers, there is limited time for prospecting. Also at 
risk is the current customer base, as constant negotiation slows down the selling process.  
A reduction in speed or frequency of the selling process results in fewer products in the 
market, in other words, a smaller share of the market.    In the words of the salesperson 
(MR7) compensated on market share but tasked with selling products priced to maximize 
profit,  
I have a particular area in my territory that is an extremely competitive 
market, it is a big market and for that reason is very important.  It is hard 
for us to meet the customer’s price requirements.  Most of the time, we do 
not give the customer the price they are requesting.  It frustrates the 
customers.  I spend 60 to 70 percent of my time in price negotiations in 
this region. Overall, I spend 40 to 50 percent of my time talking to 
customers about price.  
 
The hidden costs of misaligned goals erode an organization’s profits. Considering the 
total number of customer orders an organization processes in a year, these losses could be 






 The scope of organizational communication used in this research includes 
messages to and from the external market partners as well as to and from the internal 
marketing and sales areas. “Quality communication is the interpersonal, transactional, 
symbolic process by which individuals achieve and maintain understanding” 
(Montgomery, 1981, p. 21).   Quality communication occurs between individuals, such as 
a salesperson and a buyer, when they can interpret meaning using verbal and nonverbal 
cues. Quality communication is a process of constant interactions and develops over time 
(Montgomery, 1981).  Consider the situation where the organization is not clearly 
communicating to the customer the need to frequently adjust prices; however, the 
salesperson is sufficiently clear on his/her communication regarding the frequent price 
adjustments.  The sales professionals interviewed for this study stated that the pricing 
information was shared with customers by another functional area of the organization.  
However, the salesperson called their customers to have a follow-up conversation to 
explain why the price adjustment (usually an increase) occurred.  Salesperson PS9 is 
compensated on market share growth and the goal of the pricing strategy is profit 
maximization.  The organization that PS9 sells for strives to maintain a high profit 
margin and as raw material costs increase the organization quickly passes those costs on 
to the customers. PS9 could have chosen to improve the quality of communication 
regarding the numerous price increases by listing and explaining the various sources of 
the increase.  Instead, PS9 who is compensated on market share growth corrodes the 
communication with negative attitude.   PS9 commented,  
A couple of years ago, when I was with my other company, we had price 





customer to tell them, Guess what, we are going to change the prices, 
AGAIN. 
 
The frustration that the salesperson felt toward the organization was transmitted to the 
customer.  In this situation, misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies do not benefit the salesperson nor do they benefit the customer. It is likely that 
the reputation of the selling organization was tainted and that the customer was 
empathetic towards PS9.  Had PS9 been compensated on profit maximization, hence the 
goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies aligned, then PS9 may have 
been more motivated to clarify the organization’s communication.   
 Salesperson KB6 explains a situation involving an original equipment 
manufacturer (OEM) that tried to gain entrance into the aftermarket.  An OEM typically 
commands a high profit margin for the products. Aftermarket manufacturers are not held 
to the same standards of an OEM and therefore sell at a much lower referent price.  
Salesperson KB6 was hired by the OEM, compensated on market share growth, and was 
tasked with growing business in the aftermarket with high profit margin prices.  In 
addition to the misaligned strategies, the OEM lacked the product marketing 
infrastructure required to participate in the aftermarket. KB6 explains the lack of product 
information and how this lack of product communication impeded the sales process.  
KB6 stated,  
The quality of the product was good but their prices were too high. On the 
price list the company listed their part number and a price.  The sales 
force was not given a medium with which to communicate the benefits of 
the high priced product. There was no interchange to industry numbers, 







A low quality of internal communication may signal to the customer that there are other 
problems throughout the salesperson’s organization.  KB6 eventually became so 
frustrated that he quit the company. 
Inter-functional Relationship between Marketing and Sales 
Trade publications and academic literature have documented the sometimes 
venomous relationship between marketing and sales.  Tenuous relationships between 
marketing and sales are made worse when the goals of the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies are misaligned.  From the salesperson’s point of view, the 
pricing strategy is created by marketing, and marketing is out of touch with the market 
reality. The sales force is responsible for the implementation and success of the pricing 
strategy, yet the sales force has limited or no input and the sales force compensation goals 
are not considered.  A good example of this is reported by sales manager CS2, 
Here we are siloed. We have a VP of Marketing and a VP of Sales.  The 
fact of the matter is that sales and marketing are butting heads.  The 
marketing people are over in their fiefdom doing their stuff, and they are 
not telling us what they are doing. They think they communicate, but they 
don’t and they complain about us. The marketing guys complain, “Sales 
guys are dumb and don’t know what they are doing.  Having separate 
leaders for sales and marketing is obstructing the pursuit of sales growth 
here.” 
 
Misaligned pricing and sales force compensation goals are a forecast for imminent failure 
of one or both strategies.  Sales manager BR1 managed a sales force compensated on 
market share growth, and responded,  
Initially, the marketing department was separate from the sales 
department.  There were some very clear disconnects when marketing and 
sales weren’t working close together.  There were missteps in the 
promotion and more importantly, a lack of sales support out of the 






The success of a pricing strategy is co-owned by the marketing and sales 
functional areas.  Research by Malshi et al. (2009) demonstrated that “successful strategy 
creation and execution requires both functions (marketing and sales) to be equally 
invested in the entire process” (p. 401).  Malshi et al. (2009) found that  
“an open exchange of ideas” and a mutual “understanding of the market 
reality” were necessary to facilitate the “three main stages (groundwork, 
transfer, and follow-up)  of marketing strategy making across the 
marketing-sales interface” (p. 415).   
 
When misaligned goals emerge from the two functional areas, relationships are 
unnecessarily complicated.  
PROPOSITIONS 
 
 In the following section a series of propositions are developed based on the 
literature and interviews.  These propositions elucidate the significant challenges that 
organizations face when the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies 
are misaligned.   
Misalignment and Sales Force Behavior 
Weitz (1981, p. 85) develops a contingency framework based on the idea that the 
effectiveness of sales behaviors are at least in part determined through the interactions of  
“sales behaviors, resources of the salesperson, the nature of the customers’ buying task, 
and characteristics of the salesperson-customer relationship”.  The resources belonging to 
the salesperson include his/her sales ability, knowledge about the product and customer, 
and personal characteristics (Weitz, 1981).  In the qualitative study, Weitz (1981) 
mentions the extent to which company resources are available to the salesperson to use or 





reputation, price, delivery, and terms” (Weitz, 1981, p. 93).  Experienced salespeople 
become adept at identifying the company resources that can be easily offered to the 
customer in consolation for high prices.  The salesperson deliberately offers resources to 
customers that pose no compensation repercussions to themselves, albeit come as a cost 
to the selling organization.   The effectiveness of the sales behavior relates to the 
salesperson adapting to the sales environment only when the “result in the benefits 
outweighs the costs of practicing adaptive selling” (Weitz, Sujan & Sujan, 1986, p. 176).  
Sales manager EJM4 provides an organizationally supported solution, 
We instruct the salespeople that if they need, what we call display units, 
they can give them to the customer free of charge. We are willing to give 
the unit away if necessary to garner the business.  The salespeople have 
certain added value tools that they can use to bring the value of the order 
to where it needs to be to compete against the low ball price of a 
competitor. 
Salespeople are trained to highlight the quality of the products or services and 
accentuate the customer service element of the company when persuading a customer to 
buy (Lancioni & Gattorna, 1992).  Talking about price too early can diminish the 
salesperson’s opportunity to properly sell the products or services to the customer 
(Lancioni & Gattorna, 1992).  Pricing that is broadcast directly to the customers pre-
empts the salesperson’s ability to highlight the benefits of the company or any possibility 
of upselling to a more profitable or expensive product.  Placed in a situation where the 
customer already has knowledge of the pricing and the salesperson has conflicting goals 
of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies, requires that the salesperson 
become creative at adding value for the customer or creative in the selection of products 





be achieved.  Actively including both sales and marketing in the strategy development 
process increases the chance for goal alignment and strategy success. 
  Misalignment of strategies occurs at the time of strategy development within the 
respective functional areas. Marketing and sales collaboration must be supported with 
aligned goals and processes (Le Meunier-FitzHugh et al., 2011; Rouziès et al., 2005).   A 
disjointed planning process between the marketing and sales interface may negatively 
impact firm performance (Rouziès, et al., 2005).  In practice, the pricing strategy 
critically impacts the ability of the sales force to effectively achieve their goals and 
compensation (Joseph, 2001; Weinberg, 1975).  Anecdotally, managers dismiss claims 
made by the sales force of lost sales as a result of an unresolved price issues but they 
never really know for sure. The sales force suffers from alienation of their own firm 
where misalignment exists, while simultaneously attempting to form long-term 
relationships with their customers.   The disenfranchisement of the sales force from the 
firm due to misalignment is not only costly in the form of reduced sales, but also likely to 
be contagious to the customer resulting in reduced satisfaction with the firm.  
Performance expectations and demands accumulate to establish the role of the 
salesperson (Walker et al., 1977).  If the expectations and demands are in conflict, 
choosing and completing the appropriate task to improve the salesperson’s performance 
becomes difficult. For example, consider a sales strategy with a goal to increase market 
share by eight percent. In this scenario, for the sales force compensation strategy and the 
evaluative process to be effective, both would focus toward gaining market share.  
However, if frequent price increases by the marketing area occur in response to a 





the sales force.  In this example, the activities and behaviors of the sales force would be 
representative of a market share growth strategy while the frequent pricing increases 
suggest the pricing for a product with a profit maximization strategy.   
Pricing and sales force compensation strategies that have misaligned elements and 
conflicting goals cause confusion with regard to the evaluative standards and processes 
established for the sales force. The outcomes as a result of goal misalignment may yield 
effective yet objectionable sales behavior. Thus,  
P1: When the pricing and sales force compensation strategies are not aligned 
toward achieving congruent goals, there is a negative effect on the selling 
behaviors of the sales force. 
Perceived Effort   
When a firm has multiple incongruent goals governing the sales force, the results 
may be chaotic for the sales force. The lack of clarity of expectation can cause the sales 
force to experience role ambiguity (Miles and Perreault Jr, 1976), and role ambiguity 
increases the effort that salespeople perceive will be necessary to complete a task (Singh, 
1998).  Evidence of the resulting effort inefficiencies may also be visible to the external 
market through the sales function.  In an attempt to offset escalating prices and preserve a 
competitive level of customer value in the face of a conflicting compensation package, 
for example, the sales force may scramble to offer easily available resources that may be 
perceived as benefits to the customer but are unnecessarily costly to the organization.   
A commonly exhibited agency problem is that the goals of the principal are 
different from the goals of the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989).  When the pricing and sales force 





force are clear and role and goal ambiguity is reduced.   Allowing the sales force to focus 
on clear goals ensures the opportunity for success.   For example, consider two pricing 
strategies: one that supports a profit maximization goal and one that supports a market 
share growth goal. In general, a profit maximization price strategy removes the lengthy 
price negotiation and allows the sales force to concentrate on performance enhancing 
behaviors such as offering customers the right product or service solutions.  A market 
share growth price strategy can lengthen the sales process for the salesperson as 
discounted pricing may invite frequent price negotiations while the customer attempts to 
find the bottom or lowest price. However, a market share growth goal for the price 
strategy can also help the organization gain access to new market share.  If the sales force 
compensation strategy is aimed toward market share growth, and the pricing strategy is 
also aimed at market share growth, then the salespeople have the pricing tools, the 
direction from management, and the reward structure they need to go out and sell, and 
ultimately improve the firm’s performance through gaining market share.  Misaligned 
pricing and sales force compensation strategies invite the perception of lengthy price 
negotiations, intense manipulation of the sales environment, and unachievable 
performance expectations. Thus,  
P2: The misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies increases the salesperson’s perception of effort needed to be successful. 
Perceived Risk 
Uncertainty and subsequent resulting risk is present in the sales environment 
because of the unpredictable changes in customer needs and competitor strategies 





environment by altering policies and activities in response to multiple market changes. 
The salesperson uses past experiences and knowledge of the environment to assess the 
risks of being successful and adapts his or her behaviors to reduce that risk. Sales 
manager EJM4 reiterates,  
Salespeople will always take the path of least resistance in order to make 
a sale. They may make more money if they sell at a higher price and put in 
more effort, however they would rather make the sale than chance not 
making the sale. 
 
In highly complicated or involved selling situations the salesperson will work first 
to mitigate his or her risk regardless of the optimality for the company. A salesperson’s 
perceived risk involves achieving sales goals and consequent compensation awards.  In 
accord with previous research in this area, this dissertation assumes that the organization 
is risk neutral and the sales force is risk averse (Basu, Lal, Srinivasan & Staelin, 1985).  
Elements of the sales force control system are intended to address the behaviors of a risk-
averse sales force (Anderson et al., 1987; Basu et al., 1985; Lal & Staelin, 1986).  The 
organization assumes the risk when the sales force compensation is salary-based 
(Anderson et al., 1987).  A salaried contract releases the salesperson from compensation 
penalties should the salesperson’s behaviors fail to yield the desired sales results.  Other 
ways the organization can mitigate sales force perceptions of risk through elements of the 
control system include: 1) engaged-monitoring by sales management, and 2) the inclusion 
of the salesperson when establishing sales strategy evaluative standards (Anderson et al., 
1987).   When a salesperson is clear about the sales goals and methods of evaluation, the 
salesperson will perceive less uncertainty and therefore less risk (Bergen, Dutta & 





Role conflict occurs when the salesperson is required to meet multiple 
incongruent demands (Churchill et al., 1976; Tyagi, 1982; Walker et al., 1977). When the 
goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies are misaligned the 
salesperson perceives role conflict and therefore risk.   When product pricing goals are 
not matched with the goals of the salesperson’s compensation package, mixed signals are 
sent to the salesperson. The salesperson may be motivated by the compensation package, 
yet a pricing strategy aimed at goals incongruent to the compensation goals increases the 
uncertainty and risk that the salesperson will be successful in both achieving his or her 
objectives as well as the firm’s objectives.  Thus,  
P3: The misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies increases the salesperson’s perceived risk.  
Costs to Monitor Sales Force Outcomes 
Anderson et al. (1987) define a control system as: “an organization’s set of 
procedures for monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating its employees” (p. 
76). The organization benefits from reducing monitoring costs as a form of process 
improvement, which in turn increases manager efficiency and effectiveness.  The sales 
force control mechanism, of which sales force compensation is a part, is the most 
comprehensive part related to the costs of a firms’ product or service. Sales force 
compensation plans that are salary-based require more levels of sales management to 
monitor and assess behavior (John & Weitz, 1989).  Companies can invest in the high 
costs to monitor sales force efforts or develop a compensation program based on 





Multiple goals and differing strategies dilute the monitoring efforts of the sales 
manager. The effect of diluted sales manager effort is an increasingly inefficient and 
costly sales mechanism.  Sales force control systems do not accommodate performance 
monitoring on goals external to the sales department.  While pricing and other marketing 
strategies rely on the execution of the sales force, they require additional monitoring and 
direction from the marketing manager (Malshe et al., 2009). When pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies are aligned toward congruent goals, marketing and sales 
manager resources required to monitor and guide the efforts and behaviors of the sales 
force are streamlined and more efficient.  Misaligned goals increase monitoring 
redundancies and promote contradictory standards for evaluation of sales force 
performance.  Hence,   
P4: The misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies increases the cost of monitoring sales force outcomes. 
Organizational Resources 
Scarcity of organizational resources is a fact of life for businesses. To achieve 
high levels of performance, organizational resources such as budgets, time, energy, 
information, and personnel must not be wasted. Past literature considers the importance 
of committing both tangible and intangible resources to ensure successful strategy 
implementation (Menon, et al., 1999; Siguaw, Brown & Widing, 1994).  The failure to 
support these strategies and to work with full efficiencies leads to discord in the 
interactions between the sales force and the firm, resulting in constraints to sales or 





Efficient development of pricing strategies involves incorporating information 
from other functional areas such as costs from production, capacity and carrying costs 
from inventory management, lead times, minimum order quantities, and costs of raw 
material or components from procurement, and profit margin guidelines from accounting.  
The creation, implementation, and maintenance of a pricing strategy depends on a high 
level of information exchange between marketing and sales (Rouziès, et al., 2005).  The 
challenge of information exchange between the marketing and sales interface is 
confounded as a result of the orientation differences of their respective areas (Cespedes et 
al., 1996; Homburg et al., 2007).  The diversity of the product orientation for marketing 
and customer orientation for sales is most apparent when the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies are not aligned toward the same goal.  Over time, the above 
referenced situation and the causes of firm failure will likely be misattributed to 
obscurely related events such as poor sales forecasting, customer account selection, or 
ineffective target marketing.  The effects of inefficiencies such as divergent orientations 
are multiplied when the pricing and sales force compensation strategies are not aligned 
toward congruent goals.   
Top management must be supportive in providing resources needed to maintain 
inventory levels, breadth of product lines, efficient processes, and sufficient budgets to 
facilitate the strategies.  Firm commitment to pay the sales force commission or 
increasing sales force expenses to ensure the success of a pricing strategy is another 
example of the availability of organizational resources.  When the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies are not aligned to achieve the same goals the firm can experience 





P5: The misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies results in the inefficient use of organizational resources. 
Communication 
The efficiencies created by aligned strategies include deliberate and focused sales 
force effort and efficient use of organizational resources such as management evaluation 
time, and internal and external communication resources.  The marketing-sales interface 
literature suggests that frequent, formal and informal, bi-directional communication will 
improve the integration of the two functional areas but may not improve the performance 
of the business unit or the firm (Kahn et al., 1997; Rouziès et al., 2005; Ruekert et al., 
1987).  Over-communicating can render both groups paralyzed with indecision and 
increase redundancies in the communication process (Fisher et al., 1997; Maltz & Kohli, 
1996; Rouziès et al., 2005).   
 Effective communication across the marketing-sales interface must be 
bidirectional, of high quality, and must contribute to the purpose and goals whereby both 
areas benefit. The goal of the sales force compensation strategy should be considered the 
primary indicator of sales force activities.  From an understanding of the sales force goal 
comes the possibility for open communication and collaboration between marketing and 
sales on the development of new marketing strategies. Research by Le Meunier-FitzHugh 
and Piercy (2009) demonstrates that effective communication is an important component 
of the collaborative effort.  Bidirectional communication helps create an understanding of 
the goals of each of the areas and a broader understanding of the marketing environment 
(Malshe et al., 2009).  A high level of quality communication is void of resource 





between the functional areas promotes a unity of efforts that can enhance the creation of 
aligned, effective, and high quality strategies (Homburg et al., 2008; Malshe et al., 2009).  
Quality communication to the external market is imperative to the reputation and 
perception of the organization. As mentioned previously, internal inefficiencies and 
conflicting goals can manifest outward to the market affecting the customer and 
competitor perception of the inefficient organization.  
Communication between the marketing and sales areas is challenging as a result 
of their differing temporal based (i.e., marketing is long term and sales is short term) and 
focus based (marketing is product focused and sales is customer focused) orientations 
(Homburg et al., 2007).  Inefficient communication within the organization can transcend 
organizational boundaries and produce confusing and arbitrary communications to 
customers and competitors.  Pricing and sales force strategies that are not aligned toward 
congruent goals suggest that the organization has difficulty integrating signals received 
externally from the market with the information internally communicated by the sales 
force and sales management.  Therefore,    
P6: The misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies reduces the quality of organizational communication.   
Intra-functional Relationships Between Marketing and Sales 
The domain of the marketing-sales interface is rich in research that establishes 
antecedents of integration, optimal levels of integration, and the benefits of integration.   
This domain of literature has found that through a harmonious collaboration of ideas and 
resources the marketing and sales areas will become better integrated (Kahn et al., 1997; 





the pricing and sales force compensation strategies involves an allocation of meeting time 
to facilitate bidirectional sharing of information and the coordinated use of resources 
throughout the implementation and maintenance stages of the strategies.  
Marketing-sales interface research has varied views on what constitutes activity 
alignment.  For example, research by Cross et al. (2001), Strahle et al. (1996), and Strahle 
and Spiro (1986) suggests that the activities and tactics of the sales force are to be aligned 
with the established marketing strategies.  These works support the popular premise that 
marketing creates the strategies and the sales force implements the strategies. The 
disadvantage of this scenario is that strategy creators are not in control of the 
implementation.  The research that supports collaboration between the marketing-sales 
interface suggests that the goals of the functional areas be aligned (Le Meunier-FitzHugh 
et al., 2011).  Aligned or congruent goals provide a focal point to which all efforts can be 
unified.  
Research that promotes a collaborative effort throughout the strategy creation, 
implementation, and evaluative stages has found an increase in successful outcomes 
(Malshe et al., 2009; Rouziès et al., 2005).  Successful outcomes involving the joint-
planning process include higher quality strategies, increased value to the organization, 
and a more complete integration of the marketing-sales interface (Homburg et al., 2008; 
Menon et al., 1996; Rouziès et al., 2005).   Involving the sales force in the marketing 
strategy creation stage can help to determine potential customer issues and ensures buy-in 
of the sales force at strategy inception (Piercy, 2006).   
In practice and in extant literature, the likelihood of achieving long-term market 





Altinig, & Winsor, 2010).  Marketers struggle to seek balance between pricing their 
products and services competitively yet pricing to what the market will bear, all while 
focusing on their product goal objectives. Marketing managers have admitted to 
purposely misdirecting the sales force and sales management towards inflated sales 
volume goals to ensure sales volume objectives (Strahle, Spiro, & Acito, 1996).  As long 
as the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies are misaligned, the 
relationship between these two functional areas will continue to degrade.  
Dewsnap and Jobber (2002) report that goal conflict and in-group identity 
negatively impact the relationship between marketing and sales.  Generating revenue is 
the functional goal of the marketing and sales areas, and specifically the objective of the 
firm’s pricing strategy.  The misalignment of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies limits the ability of the functional areas to optimize revenue generation. 
Research by (Hughes, LeBon, & Malshe, 2012) suggests that a dysfunctional marketing 
sales interface may delay the “development of market based capabilities and subsequent 
competitive advantage” (p. 69).  Hence,   
P7: Misalignment of the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategies reduces the quality of the intra-functional relationship between 
marketing and sales. 
DISCUSSION 
 
 This research suggests that there are hazards of misalignment that affect the sales 
force and the organization.   Ultimately, the danger of misaligned goals is the erosion of 
firm performance. Similarly, Rouziès et al. 2005 asserts that organization performance is 





through new product launches (p. 121).   Strategies that are aligned coordinate the 
activities and efforts of the marketing and sales departments facilitating goal achievement 
and benefiting firm performance.  
As an extension of the marketing sales interface literature, this study suggests that 
a higher level of marketing sales integration will result from the process of creating goal 
focused, aligned pricing and sales force compensation strategies.  Conversely, Menon, et 
al. (1999), suggests that a high level of integration must exist, through formalization of 
processes and determination of roles, before effective, quality strategies can be created 
(Menon, et al., 1991).   Findings by Malshe and Sohi (2009) indicate that the creation of 
effective, quality strategies “across the marketing sales interface” is the result of a three 
step process that includes the creation, implementation, and evaluation (p. 415).     
 As mentioned previously, pricing literature has been intent on investigating the 
effects of a firm’s pricing strategy on the customer and the competitor (Smith & Nagle, 
1995; Dolan, 1987, Cressman & Nagle, 2002).  The most important contribution this 
research makes is identifying the effects of the firm’s pricing strategy on the sales force; 
specifically, unfavorable behaviors as a result of misaligned strategies.  Some examples 
of unfavorable behaviors include the salesperson spending 30% to 50% of their time on 
price negotiations or refusing to sell an item because the low margin of the price did not 
meet the minimum margin threshold of the compensation program.  Examples of 
salespeople giving away company profits include offering a customer free freight for the 
transportation of the goods or changing the customer’s price level to a lower, 





perceive the “giving away of company profits” as stealing from stakeholders. However 
the salespeople view their actions as off-setting the risk of being unsuccessful. 
The phenomenon of misalignment of goals emerged from the qualitative 
interviews.  When questioned about the current sales objective, the sales professional was 
quick to respond it was either profit maximization or market share.  The response was 
just as forthcoming when asked about the pricing goal. The result of the separate goal 
inquiries confirmed nine out of fifteen (60%) of the interviewees worked in environments 
in which misaligned pricing and sales force compensation goals were actively in effect.  
Only 47% of the interviewees acknowledged being in a situation where the way a 
company priced and promoted its products interfered with the sales compensation 
structure.  Yet, nearly all of the sales professionals acknowledged and discussed 
mitigating the possibility of lost sales and/or compensation as a result of a pricing 
strategy.  The participants of this research clearly articulated the repercussions of 
misalignment however could not identify the cause, which reinforces one of the original 
premises that often managers misattribute the effects of goal misalignment.    
 The two key concepts of perceived effort to be successful and the perceived risk 
of being unsuccessful emerged when some respondents communicated a sense of 
hopelessness when faced with the condition of misaligned goals. The salesperson 
perceived a greater amount of effort required to be successful under conditions of 
misalignment than when goals were aligned. The perceived risk of being unsuccessful 
emerged from the salesperson’s fears that the pricing would not allow them to compete 
and therefore fail to meet the expectations of both the selling firm and the customer.   The 





force via outcome based compensation methods as an inducement or motivator 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Cravens et al., 1993). Different from the motivating element of an 
outcome based compensation method and strategy, the misaligned pricing strategy 
produced the perceived risk of being unsuccessful which was considered, by the 
salesperson, to be a de-motivating factor.       
 Using the sample of this study as being representative of B2B markets, 
misalignment is prevalent in at least half of the B2B organizations.  For change to occur, 
managers must diligently look for the indicators of misalignment. One key indicator of 
misaligned goals is a failed pricing strategy and/or an increase in unplanned price 
negotiation on behalf of the sales force.  Management must evaluate the goals for each 
product line and be cognizant that the amount of motivation and effort with which the 
sales force will engage in goal achievement are dependent on the goals of both the 
pricing and the sales force compensation strategies.   
FUTURE RESEARCH  
 
The propositional inventory provided in this paper serves as a launch pad for 
more research on the effects of marketing strategies upon the internal sales force. 
Empirical testing of the propositions will further theory development in the area of 
pricing and sales force behavior.  The functional area of pricing has greatly expanded in 
the past ten years.  Today, many companies employ pricing analysts, strategic pricing 
managers, and/or directors of pricing analytics. Research on the relationship between the 
pricing professional and the sales professional would provide more depth to this research 







This qualitative research provides a new direction for researchers to examine the 
firm’s pricing strategy as a motivational influencer on the sales force.  Findings that 
emerged from this study indicate, as proposed, that conditions of a firm’s pricing strategy 
have resulted in adverse behaviors by the sales force.  When the goals of the pricing and 
sales force compensation strategies were conflicted the salespeople conveyed perceptions 
of more required effort to be successful.  In particular conditions the salesperson 
perceived the risk of being unsuccessful so high that they abstained from selling. 
Managing the sales force with misaligned goals gives cause to create new reports, 
extensions on evaluations, and more frequent less favorable performance evaluations.  
The sales professionals interviewed for this research want to do a good job. When the 
salesperson spoke about adding more value for the customer in an effort to salvage the 
sale, they were trying to please the customer and themselves.  More importantly, the 
salesperson seemed to have the belief that obtaining the sale, regardless of the cost, was 
better than losing the sale to a competitor.   
Aligning pricing and sales force compensation strategies toward a congruent goal 
would require joint planning between the marketing and sales functions, effective 
communication (internal to the firm and external to the market), sharing of organizational 
resources, and establishing expectations of outcomes and roles.  The anticipated 
outcomes of aligning the pricing and sales force compensation strategies include an 
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CHAPTER 3 (ESSAY 2) 
THE EFFECTS OF (MIS)ALIGNED PRICING AND SALES FORCE 
COMPENSATION STRATEGIES ON THE SALESPERSON 
 
 In this essay, the focus shifts from an understanding of the relevant relationships 
between goal misalignment, the sales force, and the organization (Essay 1) to the effects 
that this misalignment has on the individual salesperson (Essay 2).  The purpose of Essay 
2 is to use expectancy theory to examine the impact that aligned versus misaligned goals 
of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies have upon the B2B salesperson’s 
motivation and behavior.   
The first theoretical contribution of this research is to define the nature of 
alignment of differing goals for the pricing and sales force compensation strategies.  
Second, this research is designed to empirically determine how a firm’s pricing strategy 
influences salesperson motivation and behavior.  Specifically, the lens of expectancy 
theory is used to understand the salesperson’s beliefs that he/she can actually be 
successful given a situation and how the achievement of his/her goals may influence how 
he/she is perceived internally by management and externally by customers. Additionally, 





salesperson’s behavioral intentions, given conditions of alignment or misalignment of the 




 Expectancy theory prescribes that a salesperson’s actions are intentional and 
focused based on what the salesperson believes or anticipates will occur. Accordingly, 
the salesperson’s motivation to act in a certain way is a product of the beliefs that a 
salesperson has that a certain level of effort will create the necessary results and achieve 
certain rewards the salesperson values (Vroom, 1964).  Historically, expectancy theory 
has been effective in determining sales force motivation (Oliver, 1974; Peters, 1977; 
Walker, Churchill, & Ford, 1977).  The more recent expectancy theory-based research 
has concentrated on supportive leadership (Jaramillo & Mulki, 2008), incentive plans 
(Liccione, 2007), and strategy implementation (Smith, 2009).  Each of these areas offers 
foundation for this research.  
Vroom’s (1964) expectancy theory has been expounded upon and applied to 
salesperson performance (Oliver, 1974).  The core constructs of expectancy theory 
include: 1) expectancy (the belief that one’s efforts will achieve the goal); 2) 
instrumentality (the belief that if one achieves the goal, certain rewards will be gained); 
and 3) valence (the value that one has for the earned rewards).  These three constructs 
(expectancy, instrumentality, and valence) determine the salesperson’s motivation and 
subsequent behavior (Chiang, Jang, Canter, & Prince, 2008). “Expectancy theory is 
characterized by the view that behavior is purposeful, based on conscious intention, and 





The concepts of effort and expectancy seem similar, however are contrary with 
regard to goals.  When goal levels are high, salespeople perceive high effort. At the same 
time, however, lower expectancies are associated with high goal levels (Locke, 
Motowidlo, & Bobko, 1986).  This research adopts the definition of expectancy 
referenced by Miao, Lund and Evans (2009): “Expectancy is a salesperson’s estimate of 
the probability that expending a given amount of effort on a task will lead to an improved 
level of performance” (p. 245).  Expectancy has been referenced in literature as a 
probability estimate (Pritchard & Sanders, 1973) and as a higher or lower strength 
(Tyagi, 1982).  In this research, the evaluation of expectancy is categorized as higher or 
lower, which indicates the salesperson’s estimate of the chance or probability that his/her 
performance will achieve the assigned sales goal. 
Instrumentality is the salespersons’ perception of the link between a specific type 
or level of performance leading to a specific type or level of reward (Walker, et al., 
1977).  Instrumentality has been referenced in several different ways, such as positive, 
negative, or zero (Oliver, 1974), as high probability or low probability (Teas, 1981; 
Walker, et al., 1977), and as high level and low level (Hirschfeld, Schmitt & Bedeian, 
2002).  In this research, the evaluation of instrumentality is categorized as a strong link or 
a weak link, indicating the degree to which the salesperson believes a given level of 
performance will result in a given reward. Further, in this research both internal and 
external rewards are examined.  
  Valence is the salesperson’s perception of the value or importance of obtaining a 
specific reward (Pritchard et. al., 1973; Smith, 2009; Vroom, 1964).  Oliver (1974), states 





nonexistent.  Past research has indicated that valence and instrumentality are highly 
correlated, and that the latter is a better predictor of performance than valence (Oliver, 
1974; Pritchard & De Leo, 1973). Thus, this essay focuses exclusively on the impact of 
goal alignment and misalignment on expectancy and instrumentality. 
Pricing and Sales Force Compensation Goals 
 This essay considers two main, but different, goals of an organization’s strategies: 
market share growth and profit maximization.  Academic interest in the goals of market 
share growth and profit maximization include literature that debates the positive linear 
relationship between the two goals (Schwalbach, 1991; Sheth & Sisodia, 2002; Uslay, et 
al., 2010).  The Rule of Three theory, developed by Sheth and Sisodia (2002), states that 
almost every industry evolves towards the existence of three large generalist companies 
that strive towards market share growth goals and a numerous amount of small, specialist 
companies that endeavor towards profit maximization goals.  Then, there are those 
companies that Sheth and Sisodia (2002) claim live in the “ditch” with 5% to 10% of 
market share and are neither the generalist nor the specialist, whereby both strategies can 
be in play at any given time for any given product line.  Within all companies, regardless 
of size, there exists the potential for the goals of the revenue generating strategies to 
become misaligned.  The goals of market share growth and profit maximization each 
suggest a particular type of pricing and sales force compensation strategy.   
Market share growth 
Pricing 
Pricing strategies with a market share growth goal are used to further penetrate a current 





Previous literature classified pricing strategies that had a goal of increasing market share 
to be characterized by discounted prices that offer buyers an incentive to purchase the 
product (Sethuraman & Tellis, 1991). Research by Anderson, Fornell, and Lehmann 
(1994) suggests that market share growth goals when accompanied with discounted 
prices can increase customer satisfaction.  
Compensation  
This research associates a market share growth goal with a sales force 
compensation contract that incents the salesperson to sell a high level of product volume.  
Such an outcome-based compensation program allows the salesperson autonomy in 
choosing their sales methods (DelVecchio & Wagner, 2011; Mahajan, Churchill Jr, Ford, 
& Walker Jr, 1984).  Incenting a salesperson for improving an organization’s market 
share position in the market may produce short-term benefits for the salesperson. 
However, the long term effects of a market share growth goal for both the organization 
and the salesperson depend on the market continually expanding. 
Profit maximization 
Pricing 
Firms may have a product pricing goal of profit maximization when they are able to 
make use of economies of scale, capitalize on add-on sales with products that are 
mutually dependent on one another, or exploit a competitive advantage such as vertical 
integration (Tellis, 1986).  Lancioni and Gattorna (1993) suggest that an organization that 
develops pricing strategies with the goal of profit maximization “never compromises on 





customer is willing to pay and then raising “willingness to pay closer to the value 
received” (Nagle & Cressman Jr, 2002, p. 30). 
Compensation  
Sales force compensation contracts with a profit maximization goal are based on 
motivating the salesperson to achieve predetermined levels of gross margins. These types 
of contracts are typically accompanied by a significant salary component of the 
compensation package. Profit maximizing goals are established to ensure that sale of 
products below a predetermined margin will occur less frequently (Weinberg, 1975).  The 
organization removes the risk of performance uncertainty when the compensation 
contract is salary, whereby the salesperson is guaranteed a salary regardless of the 
outcome (Eisenhardt, 1989). This allows the sales force to invest in activities such as 
customer relationship building and communicating product differentiation and 
diversification benefits.  
HYPOTHESES 
Expectancy 
Expectancy theory suggests expectancy to be highest when the goals are easily 
achievable with no conflicts, as all efforts and energies contribute to increased 
performance levels.  “Because difficult goals are harder to attain than easy goals, 
expectancy of goal success would presumably be negatively related to performance” 
(Locke & Latham, 2002, p. 706).  Both aligned and misaligned goals can be perceived as 
difficult and challenging, however misaligned goals increase goal difficulty as a result of 
the goal conflict.  Goal conflict is defined by Cheng et al. (2007) as “the degree to which 





dimensions of a task, or among multiple tasks, are incompatible” (p. 222).  When the 
goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies are misaligned the 
salesperson’s levels of expectancy will likely be low.   
Significant cognition is involved when a person attempts to determine the amount 
of effort that might be required to meet or achieve expectations, and then act upon that 
assessment (Bandura, 2001). When salespeople consider the expected goals to be 
challenging their efforts are intensified. The salesperson may achieve goals that are 
congruent with effort. However, misaligned goals pose the challenge of deciding which 
goal to pursue whereby failure is eminent. Salespeople can become despondent when 
failing to achieve difficult and conflicting goals.  Research by Bandura (2001) states “if 
they read their failures as indicants of personal deficiencies; if they believe they are being 
exploited, coerced, disrespected or manipulated, they respond apathetically, 
oppositionally, or hostilely” (p. 5).  Low levels of salesperson expectancy and apathetic 
behaviors are likely to occur when assigned, misaligned goals are perceived to restrict or 
limit salesperson compensation and sales growth. When a discounted pricing approach is 
encouraged by the firm the compensation contract encourages the salesperson to invest 
time building a customer relationship and an understanding of the customer needs.  A 
profit maximization compensation strategy encourages the salesperson to sell the 
customer a product or service solution that brings the most profit to the selling firm.  In 
this situation, the salesperson will perceive extremely low expectancies as the level of 
performance required to obtain the sales goal as insurmountable.   
In the setting where the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 





and role conflict.  In specific situations where the salesperson estimates that the 
probability of his/her efforts and activities will not improve his/her level of performance, 
the salesperson’s expectancy is the lowest.  In this line of reasoning the following 
hypotheses are suggested: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: When the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategy are misaligned, the salesperson’s expectancy will be lower than 
when the goals are aligned.  
 
Hypothesis 1b:  When the goal of the sales force compensation strategy is 
profit maximization and the goal of the pricing strategy is market share 
growth, the salesperson’s expectancy will be lowest. 
 
Instrumentality  
When the salesperson considers how his/her performance, and related activities 
required to obtain that performance, relate to the reward that he/she might obtain, the 
salesperson evaluates all of the organizational elements that enable the performance as 
well as the type of reward (Teas, 1981).  For salespeople, rewards are not only financial, 
but also come in the form of recognition both internally from managers (Cron, Dubinsky, 
& Michaels, 1988; Pritchard & Sanders, 1973; Teas, 1981) and peers, and externally 
from customers (Teas, 1981).  
When the pricing and sales force compensation goals are congruent, the signals to 





(Homburg, Jensen, & Krohmer, 2008).  As a result of goal alignment, the salesperson 
feels a part of the collective sales and marketing process that also serves to reduce the 
salesperson’s perceived risk that his/her objectives will not be met. In situations where 
there is goal alignment between the pricing and sales force compensation strategies the 
salesperson will perceive the opportunity to achieve the goal that may be challenging, but 
is realizable. This provides strong instrumentality for the salesperson.  Therefore,  
 
Hypothesis 2a: When the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategy are misaligned, the salesperson’s instrumentality will be weaker 
than when the goals are aligned.  
 
Compensation contracts designed to incentivize salespeople to grow market share 
are based on providing commissions for achieving that outcome. These types of contracts 
are appealing because salespeople under these contracts require little supervision during 
the process, and instead management’s job is to measure whether the desired outcomes 
were achieved or not (Anderson et. al., 1987; Cravens, Ingram, LaForge & Young, 1993; 
Eisenhardt, 1989).  Salespeople paid to grow market share, but armed with a list price and 
no authority to discount prices, will perceive little or no opportunity to achieve their 
objectives. With this type of goal mismatch, the progress of the sales force may be easy 
to monitor, but the sales force may consider the pricing too high to achieve required 
performance objectives.  Instrumentality is low or weak if the salesperson perceives that 
there is no relation between his/her level performance and reaching a threshold or gaining 





flexibility on already higher prices, the salesperson may perceive reaching his/her goal 
impossible. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 2b: When the goal of the compensation strategy is market share 
growth and the goal of the pricing strategy is profit maximization, the 
salesperson’s instrumentality will be the weakest. 
 
Motivation 
 Sales force motivation is an accumulation of individual perceptions that precludes 
performance outcomes (Oliver, 1974; Vroom, 1964).  Expectancy theory not only 
identifies situational, organizational, and individual variables that influence behavior, the 
theory enables the exploration of the process by which these variables are influential 
(Tyagi, 1982).  The expectancy theory framework has been expanded in past literature to 
include intrinsic and extrinsic motivation types (Oliver & Anderson, 1994; Tyagi, 1982). 
Given that intrinsic motivation has been demonstrated to be a rather stable, trait-like 
individual characteristic (Amabile 1993, 1994) and that the focus of this essay is on how 
pricing—a factor external to the salesperson—affects the salesperson, extrinsic 
motivation is the more relevant variable for this research.  
 Expectancy theory offers that motivation is the result of a multiplicative 
relationship between the salesperson’s perceived level of effort required to complete or 
accomplish a task to produce progress toward his/her overall performance objective and 
instrumentality (Broedlirig, 1975).  Previous expectancy theory literature has found 





environment (Oliver, 1974; Teas et. al., 1986).  This well-established relationship among 
perceived effort, instrumentality and motivation is examined empirically in this study to 
illustrate the full influence of the interaction of pricing and sales force compensation 
goals on the salesperson. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 3: The interaction of the salesperson’s expectancy and instrumentality 
will be positively related to the salesperson’s extrinsic motivation. 
 
Behavioral Intention 
 Behavioral intention is defined as “a person’s perceived likelihood or subjective 
probability that he/she will engage in a given behavior” (Committee for Communication 
for Behavior Change in the 21
st
 Century, 2002, p. 31). According to the theory of planned 
behavior (Ajzen, 1991), behaviors are predetermined by behavioral intentions. A person’s 
behavioral intention occurs on a continuum as a measure of strength or degree of the 
intent (Armitage & Conner, 2001).  This research references a low level of salesperson 
behavioral intention for a low degree of goal commitment and a high level of behavioral 
intention for strong or high degree of goal commitment.   
The sales force compensation strategy is designed to direct salesperson behaviors 
such that the goals of the compensation strategy are achieved.  When the salesperson is 
exposed to multiple or conflicting goals the intended behaviors of each of those goals 
lose priority or focus.  Research has found that when an individual is experiencing goal 
conflict the performance of and commitment towards one goal is sacrificed at the expense 





Schaffer, 1994; Schmidt & Dolls, 2009).  Misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies allow for the salesperson to subjectively determine which goals 
to pursue, in which behaviors to engage and to what extent.  The consequence of 
misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies with regard to 
behavioral intention is the possibility of low behavioral intention.  Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 4: When the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation 
strategy are misaligned, the salesperson’s behavioral intention will be 
lower than when the goals are aligned.  
METHODOLOGY 
 
An experiment was used to test the hypotheses in this essay.  The experiment was 
scenario-based, with a between-subjects design.  The experiment was used to examine the 
differences in the expectancy, instrumentality, extrinsic motivation, and behavioral 
intention of B2B salespeople across different combinations of goals of pricing and sales 
force compensation strategies.  The design was appropriate for this research as the use of 
scenarios allowed for a more powerful and controlled manipulation of goal alignment and 
misalignment. The study was designed to ascertain the ways in which a firm’s pricing 
strategy may influence the salesperson.  
The context in which this study evaluated the effect of (mis)aligned goals of the 
pricing and sales force compensation strategies was B2B markets.  B2B markets include 
industrial sales and wholesaling wherein there tends to be a commoditization of products 
and services resulting in downward pressures on price.  Sales growth within the B2B 





The organization’s profitability and market share are premised on the selling 
organization’s pricing strategies (Homburg, Jensen, & Hahn, 2012; Ramaswamy, 
Gatignon, & Reibstein, 1994). The decisions of the sales force and the price of the 
product or service are critical marketing components which influence success for an 
organization in B2B markets (Homburg, et al., 2012).   
In the pretest and main study described in the following sections, B2B sales 
professionals were randomly assigned to one of four scenarios.  In the scenarios the goals 
were either aligned or misaligned. Specifically, the goal of the pricing strategy was either 
market share growth or profit margin maximization, and the goal of the sales force 
compensation strategy was either market share growth or profit margin maximization.  
For ease of referencing throughout the rest of this section, the scenarios will be 
referenced by the designated acronym; the compensation goal is referenced first, the 
pricing goal is referenced second.  Acronyms are shown below in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1.   Scenarios  
Strategy 
Sales Force 
Compensation Goal Pricing Goal Acronym* 
Misaligned Profit maximization Market share growth PM-Mis 
Misaligned Market share growth Profit maximization MP-Mis 
Aligned Profit maximization Profit maximization PP-Align 
Aligned Market share growth Market share growth MM-Align 
* The sales force compensation strategy goal is always referenced first within the 
acronym.  
 
After reading the scenario, the participants in each group completed a brief 
questionnaire to assess whether the conditions influenced the salespeople’s level of 
expectancy, instrumentality, extrinsic motivation and behavioral intent.  In addition, 





and to collect demographic information.  The overall goal of the research design and 
methodology was to elicit perceptions from salespeople, across industry sectors, by 
placing them in a realistic selling environment inclusive of the manipulation of key 
factors under investigation.  
An ANOVA is a test of group differences that determines whether or not two or 
more groups differ with respect to the one dependent variable.  ANCOVA is a test of 
association or covariation to determine whether or not there a relationship between two or 
more variables within a group.  A covariate is a variable that is related to the dependent 
variable (expectancy, instrumentality, or behavioral intention).  The objective of 
conducting the ANCOVA would be to remove the relationship of the covariate from the 
dependent variable prior to assessing the differences on the on the independent variables.    
ANOVA was used for the pre-test to isolate only the differences in means while the 
effectiveness of the scenarios was being assessed.  The hypotheses tested included 
control variables, thus ANCOVA was used.  To test if differences in means across groups 
existed in both the pre-test and main study, respondents were grouped.   
Multiple tests were conducted both using the groupings based on the scenario 
viewed by the respondent (therefore, a four-level factor, see Table 2.1, Acronym column) 
and a second set of groupings represented the alignment or misalignment group (a two-
level factor, see Table 2.1, Strategy column).  The information within each factor is 
unique to each level or category. The factors representing the scenarios and alignment are 
categorical variables.  A one-way ANOVA is used when there are categorical 
independent variables and one dependent variable (Leech, Barrett, & Morgan, 2008).  A 





variance to within variance.  Previous marketing literature has used ANOVA to test 
variance with scenario-based, between-subjects experiments (Dutta, Biswas, and Grewal, 
2007; Miao, Lund et al. 2009; Wagner, Hennig-Thurau, and Rudolph, 2009; Küster and 
Canales, 2011; Palazon¸ and Delgado-Ballester, 2009).  
The following section provides details on the derivation of the instrument.  
Subsequent sections describe the pretest and main study procedures, statistical tests, 
results, and conclusions.    
Design 
 The four scenarios were initially developed based on the scholar’s industry 
experience and refined through discussion with other B2B sales professionals. In 
marketing, the majority (70%) of experimental scenarios are created by the scholar 
himself/herself (Wason, Polonsky & Hyman, 2002). This convention was followed. After 
each scenario was developed, each scenario was rotated among the dissertation 
committee for refinement. Following the changes to the scenarios, each scenario was then 
shown to a group of salespeople for comments before the formal pretest.   
Prior to the pretest an analysis of the scenarios was performed with a set of B2B 
salespeople. The objective was two-fold: 1) to confirm that the language of the 
hypothetical scenarios was appropriate for the salespeople; and 2) to maximize the 
differences among the scenarios. According to previous literature, the experimental 
conditions in the scenarios should be emphasized (Burstin, Doughtie & Raphaeli, 1980) 
and created to maximally differ from one another (Kerlinger, 1973). 
 The survey that followed the scenario included reflective multi-item measures 





each variable will be provided in the pretest and main study sections. All items were 
adapted to fit the purpose of this study. The scenarios and pretest and main study survey 
items appear in Appendix B.    
Pretest 
 The pretest instrument was administered in an online panel forum. Extreme care 
was taken to protect the validity of the context, which contributed to the challenge in 
obtaining a pretest sample of 60.  The pretest was administered to 171 participants. 
However, 30 respondents were screened out of the survey as their current responsibilities 
did not include managing customers.  Respondents who did not sell into B2B markets 
also were excluded from the survey, reducing the respondent count by 44.  Two quality 
control filters were placed in strategic locations within the survey to ensure that 
respondents were indeed reading the questions.  The quality control filters asked the 
respondents to “Please select Strongly Agree to continue” and “Please select Strongly 
Disagree to continue”.  The 26 respondents who did not respond as directed were 
prevented from finishing the survey.  A total of 11 respondents had not completed the 
survey within the 10 day activity period, therefore those surveys were excluded.  The 
total pretest sample of 60 respondents is in accordance with previous literature 
(Diamantopoulos, Reynolds, & Schlegelmilch, 1994) which has suggested pretest sample 
sizes should be small (i.e., up to 100 respondents).  The sample was spread across the 
four groups through the randomization of scenarios and established quotas for each 









Table 2.2.  Pretest respondents per condition  







 The 60 sales professionals who participated in the pretest met two criteria: 1) they 
had account responsibilities, and 2) they sold in B2B markets.  The demographics in 
Table 2.3 indicate that the sample was suitable and representative of B2B sales 
professionals and therefore appropriate for the pretest. 
Table 2.3.   Pretest participant demographics 
 
 








1-9 years 30 50.0 50.0
25 41.6 91.6
5 8.3 100.0




Sales Manager with accounts


















Male 39 65.0 65.0










Retail 4 6.7 21.7
3 5.0 26.7




Clothing 2 3.3 50.0




























*Accessories, Agriculture Products, Cell Phones, Corporate 
Management, Electrical, Finance, Healthcare, Housing, 
Industrial, Information Technology, Jewelry, Merchant 
Services, Metal Fasteners, Metal Finishing/Manufacturing, 
Office Supplies, Printing, Publishing, Pump & Motors, 
Services, Souvenirs, Telemarketing, Wholesale, Wine.
* 24 Industries
20%-29%















The overall results of the pretest were not as strong as expected, and the 
hypotheses were not tested since one of the manipulation checks did not operate as 
intended.  However, valuable insights were gained in the pretest (as is part of the purpose 
of a pretest), and changes that will be explained later were made to the main study based 
on these findings. The statistical program, SPSS 18, was used to determine descriptive 
statistics, assess the reliability of the scales with Cronbach’s alpha, and analyze 
differences across groups with ANOVA. The following sections evaluate the 
effectiveness of the manipulations and the reliability of the variables of interest during 
the actual pretest of the instrument.   
 Manipulation Check and Related Issues 
 To create realistic manipulations, the author consulted with salespeople within the 
context of this research (Wagner et al., 2009).   The interviews from Essay 1 provided 
common details of pricing and sales force compensation goals.  To test the 
manipulations, a one-way ANOVA was performed to determine if the results differed 
across scenarios as intended. The manipulation check question for the pricing strategy 
asked participants to reflect on the scenario they had just read and select a response to “In 
the scenario, the goal of the pricing strategy is to maximize profits” (1 = “strongly 
disagree to 7 = “strongly agree”).  To test whether or not differences existed, respondents 
who had viewed a scenario containing a profit maximizing pricing goal (MP-Mis and PP-
Align) were grouped together and called “Price_Strat_Profit” and compared to the two 
groups who did not view a scenario containing a profit maximizing pricing goal (MM-





groups found that the manipulation was successful (Price_Strat_Profit: M = 5.86, SD = 
1.22; NOT_Price_Strat_Profit: M = 4.90, SD = 1.72; F = 6.14, p ≤ .05).   
 The other manipulation check question was used to evaluate the strength of the 
differences in the scenarios for the goal of the sales force compensation strategy.  
Participants were asked to reflect on the scenario they had just read and select a response 
to the question “In the scenario, the goal of the sales force compensation strategy is to 
increase market share” (1 = “strongly disagree to 7 = “strongly agree”).  To analyze this 
manipulation, a new variable (Comp_Strat_MS) was computed grouping those 
respondents who had viewed a condition where the sales force compensation goal was 
market share growth (MP-Mis and MM-Align) and those who had not. The results of this 
sales force compensation manipulation check were not as strong as expected 
(Comp_Strat_MS: M = 5.87, SD = 1.14; NOT_Comp_Strat_MS: M = 5.30, SD = 1.62; F 
= 2.45, p = .12).   
 Research has shown that order effects recall (Dahl, Brimacombe, and Lindsay, 
2008; St Clair-Thompson, and Allen, 2012).  Respondents in experiments are more likely 
to recall the items presented at the end of a long series of information, called recency 
effect, as opposed to placing more weight or recalling the items at the beginning of a long 
series of information, called primacy effect (Pinsker, 2011).  Research has found that 
information length and pattern can reduce order effects (Trotman and Wright, 2000). To 
mitigate this concern a summary statement describing both goals was added to the end of 
the scenarios. For example, “In summary, the goal of the sale force compensation 
strategy is to maximize profits and the goal of the pricing strategy is to increase market 






 Research by Darley and Lim (1994) notes that “creating realism and involvement 
checks is a difficult endeavor, [and] the importance of ensuring experimental realism 
calls for nothing less” (p. 493).  The realism of the selling environment was tested with 
two items.  Salespeople were asked the degree to which they agreed with the following 
two statements: “I can imagine a company actually implementing the initiatives described 
in the scenario”, and “The sales situation described in the scenario likely occurs in 
business today” (1 = “strongly disagree to 7 = “strongly agree”).  A new composite 
variable was computed from the average of the two realism items. For future reference, 
this scale item is called Realism.   
 To test whether realism differed across scenarios (as well as to test for differences 
in other constructs throughout the study), a variable was computed that identified whether 
a particular condition was aligned or misaligned. For future reference, this variable will 
be referred to as Alignment.  A one-way ANOVA tested whether perceptions of Realism 
differed across conditions of aligned goals versus misaligned goals.  Results showed no 
significant difference in the rating of scenario realism.  Overall, the participants found the 
scenario to be realistic. (Aligned: M = 5.77, SD = .98; Misaligned: M = 5.77, SD = .96; F 
= .00, p = .99).  The realism items were retained for the main study. 
Interpretation Check 
 The interpretation check was established to verify the attractiveness of the reward 
described in the scenario as offered by the company if the salesperson achieved the sales 
force compensation goal.   In the scenario, the participants learned that the commission 





goal.” The interpretation of the attractiveness of the reward was measured on a seven-
point Likert scale ranging from (1) “very unattractive” to (7) “very attractive”.  An 
analysis of variance for participants who viewed the aligned conditions versus those who 
viewed misaligned conditions was not statistically significant (≤ .05) (Aligned: M = 5.03, 
SD = 1.15; Misaligned: M = 4.87, SD = 1.28; F = .86, p = .46).  The interpretation check 
verifies that across scenarios the commission is not influencing one group more than any 
other.  This item was retained for the main study.  
Conflict Check 
 The study suggests that salespeople who were exposed to the misaligned 
conditions should experience a higher degree of goal conflict than the salespeople 
exposed to the aligned conditions.  The conflict check item was adapted from the goal 
conflict scale of Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah and Schaffer (1994).  Participants were asked, 
“To what degree do you feel the pricing goal in the scenario is in conflict with the sales 
force compensation goal?” (0= “not at all” to 100= “completely”).  Analysis of variance 
was used to test the difference in perceptions of goal conflict between aligned and 
misaligned groups. While directionally appropriate (misaligned groups rated a higher 
level of goal conflict than aligned groups), there was near significance (where 
significance ≤ .05) regarding respondent goal conflict between those exposed to the 
aligned scenarios versus the participants exposed to the misaligned scenarios (Aligned: M 
= 58.07, SD = 22.06; Misaligned: M = 68.16, SD = 20.761; F = 3.33, p = .07).  As 
indicated earlier, the addition of the summary statement to the scenarios in the main study 
was expected to make the conditions more robust to the participant.  For the main study, a 





pricing strategy is in conflict with the goal of the sales force compensation strategy” and 
was measured on a seven-point Likert scale with anchors 1= “strongly disagree” to 7= 
“strongly agree”.   
Behavioral Intention 
 In this study, behavioral intention reflects the extent to which the salesperson will 
commit to the activities and behaviors needed to pursue a stated goal.  The two 
behavioral intent items were adapted from Locke et al. (1994). The respondents were 
asked to reflect on the degree to which they would: 1) “try to achieve the pricing goal”, 
and 2) “try to achieve the sales force compensation goal” (0 = “not at all” to 100 = 
“completely”).  
 A higher level of behavioral intention is expected of a salesperson when the goals 
are aligned.  A one-way ANOVA was used to determine whether the behavioral intention 
differed across the two groups. The salesperson’s intention to achieve the goals of the 
scenarios was not significantly different across aligned or misaligned strategies (Aligned: 
M = 78.03, SD = 18.73; Misaligned: M = 81.50, SD = 15.08; F = .63, p = .43).  As noted 
previously, the strength of the scenarios needed to be improved.  The behavioral intention 
items were retained for the main study. 
Expectancy 
 The measure of a salesperson’s estimate of the probability that a prescribed 
amount of effort will lead to a higher level of performance was adapted from Sims et al. 
(1976).  The five items were developed to quantify a salesperson’s probability estimates 
of successful sales goal achievement. For example, survey participants were asked to 





duties as well as I am capable would result in reaching my sales goal,” measured on a 
seven-point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree to 7 = “strongly agree”). The reliability 
analysis on the five-item expectancy scale produced a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
.84. This measure of internal reliability would be improved to .91 with the removal of the 
one reverse coded item: “It would be unlikely that my efforts would enable me to achieve 
the goal for this product line”.  This item was omitted for the main study.   
 When analyzing the variance of the four-item expectancy scale across aligned and 
misaligned conditions, salesperson expectancy for viewers of the aligned scenarios was 
not significantly different from the respondents who viewed the misaligned scenarios. A 
one-way ANOVA was used to determine whether Expectancy differed across the two 
groups represented by Alignment (Aligned: M = 4.95, SD = .95; Misaligned: M = 4.63, 
SD = 1.20; F = 1.35, p = .25).  The four items were retained for the main study, and as 
mentioned before the scenarios were refined.  
Instrumentality 
Instrumentality is the salesperson’s perceived link between performance and 
reward.  The five item scale was adapted from Teas (1981).  Of the five survey items 
used to measure instrumentality, two questions focused on monetary rewards and three 
questions concentrated on performance recognition. Throughout the rest of this section, 
the constructs will are referenced as INST_ Monet with items coded as INST_Monet a, 
INST_Monet_b; and INST_Perf_Rec with items coded as INST_Perf_Rec_c, 
INST_Perf_Rec_d, and INST_Perf_Rec_e.  Examples of instrumentality items include 
“If I achieve my sales goal, I will be viewed more favorably by my customers” and 





point Likert scale (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”).   The internal 
reliability for the five items creating the instrumentality construct was .61. However, 
including the two items in INST_Monet resulted in an improved Cronbach’s alpha of .78.  
The univariate analysis of variance of INST_Monet exhibited near significance (where 
significance ≤ .05) between aligned and misaligned scenario conditions (Aligned: M = 
5.43, SD = 1.05; Misaligned: M = 5.89, SD = 1.00; F = 2.93, p = .09). 
 Given these results and a review of the literature, the decision was made to create 
a more voluminous, multi-dimensional scale for the main study (Chowdhury, 1993; Cron, 
et al., 1988).  An eight-item instrumentality measure was created for the main study. The 
monetary reward dimension was expanded by one item (for a total of three items), which 
stated: “If I reach my sales goal my overall pay will increase.”  The instrumentality 
dimension representing performance recognition was expanded to five items—three 
items reflecting customer recognition of the salesperson’s efforts and two items reflecting 
recognition of the salesperson within his/her own firm. The items in the pretest 
maintained the multi-dimensional complexity of instrumentality scales with much fewer 
items, which may have been the reason for a low internal reliability score.  
Extrinsic Motivation 
 Extrinsic motivation is the existence of an entity “external to the work” that 
stimulates a level of performance; examples are “a reward or recognition” (Amabile, Hill, 
Hennessey, & Tighe, 1994, p. 950).  A five-item scale adapted from Amabile et al. 
(1994) was used to assess the level of extrinsic motivation across aligned and misaligned 
strategies condition groups. One such item included “the extra money that I could earn 





disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”).  The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .86 was again 
above the recommended level of .70 (Nunnally, 1978).  A one-way ANOVA was used to 
determine whether extrinsic motivation differed across the two groups represented by 
Alignment.  There was no significant difference (Aligned: M = 5.64, SD = 1.01; 
Misaligned: M = 5.96, SD = .86; F = 1.74, p = .19). All items were retained for the main 
study. 
Goal Difficulty 
 Goal difficulty “refers to the difficulty individuals perceive in implementing a 
goal” (Fang, Palmatier, & Evans, 2004, p. 189).  If goals are misaligned, the perception 
of goal difficulty should increase. The internal reliability of the three-item scale was .39. 
However, reliability increased to .63 with the removal of the reverse coded item “I would 
have little difficulty in reaching my assigned sales goal,” measured on a seven-point scale 
(1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”.  Following a further review of the other 
two items “My assigned sales goal would be very difficult to achieve” and “Given the 
details in the scenario, my assigned sales goal is challenging,” and the goal difficulty 
literature, a decision was made to make the questions more relevant to the pricing 
strategy and more specific with regard to the level of difficulty.   
 New goal difficulty questions were created for the main study. The new questions 
included: “The pricing strategy will make it more difficult to achieve my assigned sales 
goal” (1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”); “The pricing strategy makes 
achieving the assigned sales goal ___,” (1 = “much easier” to 7 = “much harder”); and “ 





“very difficult”).  The enhanced questions and the more robust scenarios were designed 
to improve the reliability of this construct for the main study.  
Main Study 
 
Based on the findings of the pretest, the following changes were made to the 
instrument for the main study: the scenarios were strengthened; one additional conflict 
manipulation item was added; three additional instrumentality items were added; and the 
three goal difficulty questions were enhanced to reference both pricing and sales goals.  
In addition, the scenarios were made more robust with a summary statement at the end of 
each scenario, for example in the PP-Align scenario the summary statement read as 
follows, “In summary, the goal of the sales force compensation strategy is to maximize 
profits and the goal of the pricing strategy is to maximize profits.”  The addition of this 
statement improved the manipulation effects, signifying that indeed respondents read and 
understood the goals of both the pricing and sales force compensation strategies 
described in the scenarios. The conflict manipulation check was effectively strengthened 
with the addition of a second, more direct question.  More depth was added to the 
instrumentality construct.  The main study added three items to the five items used in the 
pretest.  The additional instrumentality items included one new item representing 
monetary rewards and two items representing customer facing performance recognition.  
The three goal difficulty items were made more specific by referencing the pricing and 
the sales goal in each item. In the pretest, the items only referenced the sales goal.  
Data for the main study was collected after the analysis of the pretest was 
completed and the instrument was amended as noted in the previous sections. The main 





seven days. A total of 1,670 individuals were invited to participate although not all were 
qualified to participate in the study.  The breakdown of respondents (1,325) that were 
either not qualified or that did not respond to qualifier questions included: 1) they did not 
begin the survey (less 81 respondents), 2) they did not provide consent to participate in 
the survey (less 260 respondents), 3) they did not respond to the question regarding their 
current job responsibilities (less 46 respondents), 4) their current responsibilities did not 
include managing customers (less 442 respondents), or 5) they did not sell into B2B 
markets (less 496 respondents).  The remaining 345 qualified respondents comprised of 
invited and consenting online panel sales professionals that had account responsibilities 
and sold in B2B markets.  
Further evaluation of the 345 qualified respondents resulted in elimination of 170 
respondents for reasons that included:  1) they failed to respond to a question (less a total 
of 35 respondents) or 2) they failed one of the two quality control filters placed randomly 
in the survey (less a total of 135 respondents).   The remaining 175 respondents (51% of 
345) were then evaluated on passing or failing the manipulation check and conflict 
verification questions.  Details of the manipulation check process are to follow in the 
manipulation check section.  Table 2.4 Main Study Survey Participation details the 












Table 2.4.  Main study survey participation  






Count Percent*  
Invited to participate in the Survey 1670 1670 nq 
Began the survey 1589 -81 nq 
Gave consent to participate 1329 -260 nq 
Responded to question 2 (What 
describes your job?) 1283 -46 nq 
Had account responsibilities 841 -442 nq 
Sold in B2B markets 345 -496 100% 
Responded to question 4 (Manipulation 
check) 325 -20 94% 
Responded to question 6 (Realism 
check) 317 -8 92% 
Responded to question 13 (Behavioral 
intention) 314 -3 91% 
Passed first quality control filter (Select 
Strongly Agree to continue) 213 -101 62% 
Passed second quality control filter 
(Select Strongly Disagree to continue) 179 -34 52% 
Responded to years of selling experience 175 -4 51% 
Passed compensation manipulation 
check 151 -24 44% 
Passed pricing manipulation check 138 -13 40% 
Determined degree of conflict 136 -2 39% 
Identified goal conflict 135 -1 39% 
* nq = respondent not qualified to participate in the survey.                                                
Percentage reported is what is remaining from the qualified sample of 345. 
 
Main Study Analysis 
 
Manipulation Check and Related Issues 
 The data from the remaining 175 respondents was evaluated to confirm that 





sales force compensation strategies. Additional confirmations were made to assure that 
the online panel respondents were not merely selecting options without clearly reading 
the scenario. While a researcher cannot read the mind of the respondent, additional 
efforts can be taken to systematically assess additional manipulation checks. (See Perdue 
and Summers [1986] for additional approaches to manipulation checks in experiments.) 
The decision rules applied (four separate double elimination procedures based on extreme 
responses indicating lack of understanding the experimental scenarios) can be duplicated 
on similar contextual samples such that the sample would yield similar findings.  The 
double elimination procedures considered the affirmation (understanding) and negation 
(lack of understanding) of the compensation, pricing, and alignment/misalignment 
manipulations.  
The first manipulation check question asked respondents to confirm the sales 
force compensation goal in the scenario, “The goal of the sales force compensation 
strategy is to increase market share (1= "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree").”  
Elimination evaluation for the first check involved looking at respondents that viewed 
compensation scenarios where the compensation strategy was profit maximization (PM 
and PP) and eliminating all respondents that chose seven, “strongly agree” (i.e., they 
believed the goal was market share when it was profit maximization).  An additional 
evaluation was then performed to verify the affirmation.  All of the respondents that 
viewed compensation scenarios where the compensation strategy was market share 
growth (MP and MM) and chose one, “strongly disagree” were removed (i.e., did not 
believe the goal was market share when it was in fact market share).  In total 24 





of 345 qualified respondents) were then evaluated for passing or failing the pricing goal 
manipulation.  
The second, double elimination procedure occurred when respondents were 
requested to report if the goal of the pricing strategy, in the scenario, was to maximize 
profits. Consistent with the evaluation of the first manipulation check question, the 
responses to the question, “The goal of the pricing strategy is to maximize profits,” based 
on 1 = "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly agree" were evaluated and eliminated when 
the manipulation clearly failed.  Those respondents that viewed a scenario where the 
pricing strategy was market share (PM and MM) and chose a response of seven, 
“strongly agree” were eliminated (i.e., they believed the goal was profit maximization 
when it was market share).   The second step in the pricing evaluation process included 
respondents that viewed a scenario where the pricing strategy goal was to maximize 
profits (MP and PP) and chose a one “strongly disagree”; those respondents were 
eliminated (i.e., they did not believe the goal was profit maximization when it was in fact 
profit maximization).  In total 13 responses were eliminated based on this method. 
The remaining 138 responses (40% of 345 qualified respondents) were evaluated 
based on the identification of congruent or incongruent goals.  In the third evaluation 
manipulation procedure, the respondents were asked to determine the degree of goal 
congruence in the scenario they viewed. The responses to the question, “To what degree 
do you feel the pricing goal in the scenario is in conflict with the sales force 
compensation goal? (0 = "not at all" to 100 = "completely"),” were reviewed based on the 
established decision rule. If the respondent viewed a scenario with congruent goals (MM 





(i.e., they believed the goals were in conflict when the goals were not in conflict). During 
the second confirmation of manipulation on this question, respondents that viewed a 
scenario with incongruent or misaligned goals (PM or MP) and indicated that the goals 
were “not at all” in conflict were removed (i.e. they did not believe the goals were in 
conflict when the goals were in fact in conflict). Only two respondents were removed.   
In the fourth elimination, the remaining 136 respondents (39.4% of 345 qualified 
respondents) were evaluated on their ability to identify goal congruence or incongruence 
in the scenario.  Once again, a double elimination procedure was performed on the 
responses. The question, “The goal of the pricing strategy is in conflict with the goal of 
the sales force compensation strategy, respond, 1= "strongly disagree" to 7 = "strongly 
agree",” allowed salespeople to choose the response that applied to the scenario that was 
viewed.  Respondents that viewed scenarios that affirmed the sentence, (scenarios PM 
and MP) and yet chose one, “strongly disagree” were removed (i.e., they did not believe 
the goals were in conflict when they were in fact in conflict).  Likewise, respondents that 
viewed scenarios that negated the sentence, (scenarios PP and MM) and yet chose seven, 
“strongly agree” were removed (i.e., they believed the goals were in conflict when they 
were not in conflict).  Only one respondent was removed. The main study sample resulted 
in a total of 135 out of the 345 qualified respondents completing the survey for a 39% 
usable response rate.    
 The last evaluation method used to eliminate respondents was response time.  
Insufficient response time and excessive response time when compared to the average 
were eliminated (Swain, Weathers, & Niedrich, 2008).  After all of the prior evaluation, 





time.  The evaluation of the manipulations of this study followed a strict removal process 
that better ensured the validity of the experimental process. Removing those respondents 
that failed the manipulation checks using the Extreme method resulted in a sample size of 
135 respondents, spread relatively equally across conditions. The sample size of 135 was 
used to test the hypotheses. A breakdown of the demographics is listed below in Table 
2.5. 
Table 2.5.  Main study participant demographics 
 
Participant demographics (n = 135  salespeople) 
  Variable   Number Percent 
Job Title 
   
 
Salesperson 61 45.0 
 
Sales Manager with accounts 50 37.0 
 






0-14 years 69 51.1 
 
> 15 years 66 48.9 
Company Sales Experience 
  
 
1-9 years 91 67.0 
 
10-19 years 31 23.0 
 
> 20 years 13 10.0 
Gender 
   
 
Male 77 57.0 
 




High School/GED 13 9.6 
 
Some College 30 22.2 
 
2-Year College Degree 24 17.8 
 
4-Year College Degree 52 38.5 
 
Graduate Degree 16 11.9 
Industry 
   
 
Service 79 59.4 
 





Table 2.5 continued 
 
Commission % of Compensation 
  
 
0-24% 64 48.1 
  25%-100% 69 51.9 
 
The distribution of respondents across groups is listed in Table 2.6.  
Table 2.6.  Main study respondent per condition 






 To test the manipulations of the sales force compensation and pricing goals, two 
separate one-way ANOVAs were performed using the variable created from the 
manipulation items; one for checking the manipulation of the compensation strategy 
(Manip_Ck_Compensation) and one for checking the manipulation of the pricing strategy 
(Manip_Ck_Pricing).  An ANOVA testing the compensation goal used 
Manip_Ck_Compensation across the variable that represented all scenarios with a market 
share compensation goal, Comp_Strat_MS.  The difference in Manip_Ck_Compensation 
was significant (≤ .001) across those conditions with a market share compensation 
strategy and those without a market share compensation strategy (Comp_Strat_MS: M = 
5.89, SD = 1.20; NOT_Comp_Strat_MS: M = 4.16, SD = 1.67; F = 48.908, p ≤ .001). 
 A one-way ANOVA was used to determine whether the variable representing 
pricing goal manipulation called Manip_Ck_Pricing differed across scenarios where the 
pricing goal was profit and where the pricing goal was not profit, using the variable 





(Price_Strat_Profit: M = 6.06, SD = 1.20; NOT_Price_Strat_Profit: M = 4.60, SD = 1.72; 
F = 61.82, p ≤ .001). The additional summary statement that was added to the end of each 
scenario helped respondents clearly identify the goals for both the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies. 
Realism Check 
 Similar to the pretest, the measure of the realism of the scenario that respondents 
viewed had strong internal reliability; the Cronbach’s alpha was .80.  A one-way 
ANOVA was used to determine whether Realism differed across the two groups 
represented by Alignment.  There were no significant differences across conditions.  
Once again, overall the participants found the scenario to be realistic (Aligned: M = 5.61, 
SD = 1.29; Misaligned: M = 5.46, SD = 1.28; F = .51, p = .48). 
Interpretation Check 
 The interpretation check was established to verify the attractiveness of the reward 
in the scenario for achieving the sales force compensation goal.   An ANOVA testing 
whether participants who viewed the aligned conditions responded differently from the 
participants exposed to the misaligned conditions was not statistically significant at a 
level of ≤ .05. The one-way ANOVA used the variable for interpretation as the dependent 
variable and Alignment as the independent variable. The interpretation check verifies that 
across scenarios, the commission is not influencing one group more than any other  
(Aligned: M = 5.15, SD = 1.56; Misaligned: M = 4.84, SD = 1.64; F = 1.61, p = .21). 
Conflict Check 
 In the main study, participants were asked two conflict check items.  The first 





the scenario is in conflict with the sales force compensation goal?” (0 = “not at all” to 
100 = “completely”).  The second item (referred to as Conflict_Ck_b) asked “Is the goal 
of the pricing strategy in conflict with the goal of the sales force compensation strategy” 
(1 = “strongly disagree” to 7 = “strongly agree”). A one-way ANOVA was used to 
determine whether Conflict_Ck_a differed across the two Alignment groups.  As 
expected, the difference was significant (≤ .05) such that that those respondents who 
viewed a misaligned condition responded on average greater than those respondents who 
viewed an aligned condition (Aligned: M = 49.75, SD = 30.33; Misaligned: M = 60.14, 
SD = 25.63; F = 5.57, p ≤ .05). 
 For the second goal conflict item, Conflict_Ck_b, respondents who experienced a 
misaligned scenario rated conflict significantly higher (≤ .001) than respondents who 
experienced a scenario with aligned goals (Aligned:  M = 3.77, SD = 1.77; Misaligned: M 
= 4.67, SD = 1.53; F = 13.56, p ≤ .001).  Thus, the addition of the summary statement to 
the scenario was effective in creating distinct and clear descriptions for the respondent.   
Behavioral Intention 
 In the hypotheses section, the results will be presented that show a salesperson’s 
intention to achieve goals was significantly higher for respondents that viewed an aligned 
scenario than those respondents that had viewed a misaligned scenario.   
Expectancy 
 During the pretest, the reverse-coded item included in the scale performed poorly 
when included with the other items. For the main study, the four-item expectancy scale 
produced a coefficient alpha of .92.  Also for the main study, salesperson expectancy for 





viewed the misaligned scenarios. The results for the hypothesis test involving expectancy 
will be discussed further in the hypotheses section.  
Instrumentality 
After evaluating the pretest results, the decision was made to expand the number 
of items (from 5 to 8 items) that represented salesperson instrumentality.  The Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficient of .82 for the instrumentality scale in the main study was well above the 
recommended level of .70 (DeVellis, 1991; Eisinga, Grotenhuis, and Pelzer, 2012).  The 
multi-dimensionality of the eight-item Instrumentality scale is as follows:  three items 
representing monetary rewards (referenced as INST_Monet) and five items representing 
performance recognition. The five items for performance recognition represented two 
dimensions: internal performance recognition from within the organizational (two-item 
measure referenced as Inst_Org_Rec) and external performance recognition from the 
customer (three-item measure referenced as Inst_Org_Rec). All survey items used in the 
main study appear in Appendix B.    
Because of the changes made to the scale, tests performed to verify the 
instrumentality scale used in the main study included: construct reliability, convergent 
validity, discriminant validity, and nomological validity.  Convergent validity of the 
variables was performed using three tests: 1) the Eigenvalue check (rule > 1.00); 2) the 
Average Variance Extracted (AVE) test (rule: > .50; and 3) construct reliability (rule: ≥ 
.70 is good, between .60-.69 is marginal) according to common guidelines (DeVellis, 
1991; Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). DeVillis (1991) and Nunnally et al. (1994) suggest 
that lower values for exploratory constructs are acceptable. Convergent validity was 





converging on the same concepts. The results for the tests of convergent validity can be 
viewed in Table 2.7. 
Table 2.7.   PCA Convergent validity report 
  
Customer_Facing
_Instrumentality INST_Monet Inst_Org_Rec 
Eigenvalue 3.75 1.90 0.99 
Check Pass Pass Fail 
        
AVE 77.80 63.20 49.50 
Test 2: Good Good Acceptable 
        
Construct 
Reliability 0.91 0.87 0.87 
Test 3: Good Good Good 
 
 Discriminant validity determines if monetary reward items, customer facing 
performance recognition items, and organizational recognition items are measuring 
different concepts.  According to Hair et al. (2010), one way to test discriminant validity 
is to determine whether the average variance within the items is greater than the variance 
the items share with other constructs: “the within variance extracted estimates should be 
greater than the squared between correlation estimates,” (p. 688).  The findings indicate 
that monetary rewards, customer facing performance recognition, and organizational 
performance recognition are measuring unique concepts.  The correlation matrix and 
squared correlation matrix can be viewed in Table 2.8.  The squared correlations are 











Table 2.8.  Discriminant validity test results 
 
 Nomological validity verifies that the items in the construct correlation matrix are 
consistent with theory and logic. A check of the correlations among these variables was 
performed and nomological validity was confirmed.   
An internal reliability test was performed on the three items representing 
monetary rewards. The coefficient alpha score was .74, and with the removal of 
INST_Monet_c the alpha score improves to .76.  This item was retained to maintain a 
three-item scale. The internal reliability results for the internal performance recognition 
from within the organization produced a coefficient alpha of .85. The variable 
representing external performance recognition from the customer had a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .90.   The results for the hypothesis test involving instrumentality will be discussed 






























 Expectancy theory maintains that extrinsic motivation exhibits a multiplicative 
relation between expectancy and instrumentality.  This research hopes to reconfirm that 
relationship in the hypotheses section.  The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the five-item 
measure was .86.  The internal reliability score increased to .89 with the removal of the 
question “If I were in the situation described in the scenario, I would be strongly 
motivated by the recognition I could earn from other people,” measured on a seven-point 
scale (1)”strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”.   
 A one-way ANOVA was performed with the four-item (averaged) extrinsic 
motivation construct as the dependent variable and Alignment as the independent 
variable. The results showed there was no significant (≤ .05) difference in the means of 
the aligned and misaligned conditions (Aligned: M = 5.67, SD = 1.00) (Misaligned: M = 
5.69, SD = 1.06) (F = .03, p = .88).  
Control Variables 
 The six control variables used in the analysis included; sales experience, company 
experience, gender, education, industry, and commission. Previous sales motivation 
research suggested that gender, job experience, education, and industry may be related to 
expectancy (Cron et al., 1988; Teas, 1981; Walker et al., 1977).  The variables sales 
experience, and commission (incentive compensation) have been suggested to be related 
to instrumentality in previous research (Zoltners, Sinha, & Lorimer, 2012; Murphy & 
Dacin, 1998).   In Essay 1, the respondents would often talk about the pricing strategy in 
relation to a specific product or service.  Therefore, it was important to include the 





the respondents worked for a large number of industries, so a consolidation mechanism 
was necessary.  The 135 sales professionals were grouped based on industry and pay 
portfolio (percent of current annual compensation that is commission). 
 The salesperson’s industry for 135 respondents yielded 97 different industries.  
The 97 unique industries were evaluated based on what was being sold and the new 
variable was coded Two_Category_Industry.  In Essay 1, those in the insurance industry 
sold a service and those in the automotive aftermarket sold products.  In Essay 2, the 
industries were similarly divided into those selling primarily products and those selling 
primarily services. For example, the respondents that indicated restaurant equipment, 
manufacturing, and wine and spirits were coded as products.  In contrast, respondents 
indicating insurance, banking, and rail freight transportation were coded as Services. 
Previous salesperson motivation literature references the demographic variable that 
delineates what the salesperson sells as products and services (Smith, Jones, & Blair, 
2000). Two individuals working independently sorted the industries into the two groups 
and then compared the results, resolving any differences via discussion.   
 The proportion of gender, industry (product, service), and percent of salary that is 
commission per aligned and misaligned scenarios is displayed in Table 2.9. 





Aligned MISaligned Total 
Gender 
   Male 39 38 58 
Female 26 32 77 
Total 65 70 135 
 
 
Table 2.9 continued 
 






   Services 39 40 79 
Products 24 30 54 
Total 63 70 133* 
    Two_Category_Commission 
  Smaller- < 25% 29 35 64 
Larger- >25% 35 34 69 
Total 64 69 133* 
* Missing data 
    
 The variable that represented the percent of annual compensation that is 
commission yielded 32 responses not including two missing data entries.  Based on the 
cumulative percent of the frequency distribution, nearly half of the respondents (48.1%) 
reported a smaller percent of annual pay that was commission, which equated to 24% or 
less, and the remaining respondents (51.9%) reported a larger percent of annual pay that 
was commission, which equated to 25% -100%.  The new item was coded 
Two_Cat_Commission.  
 A further evaluation of the sample included computing ANOVAs to determine if 
the variance in sales experience, company experience, education, and commission were 
significantly different across aligned or misaligned scenarios. Company experience was 
shown to be significantly different (≤ .05) for respondents across aligned and misaligned 










Table 2.10.  Main study demographics 
      
 
Pricing and Sales Force 
Compensation Strategies 
     Aligned Misaligned df F sig. 
Sales Experience 
16.06            
(11.66) 
15.13                      
(10.25) 1 0.24 0.62 
Company 
Experience 
9.51                  
(8.41) 
6.74                         
(5.31) 1 5.30 0.02* 
Education Level 
4.28                  
(1.16) 
4.14                         
(1.20) 1 0.42 0.52 
Commission 
42.59      
(38.01) 
36.16      
(36.17) 1 0.99 0.32 
* p ≤ .05 
     Values in parentheses are standard deviation. 





 A GLM analysis of variance was used to examine how the organization’s pricing 
strategy affects the salesperson and test the hypotheses. The GLM method allowed 
multiple independent categorical variables, as well as continuous dependent variables, to 
be easily tested within the same model.       
Hypothesis 1 Expectancy 
 
H1a: When the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategy are 
misaligned, the salesperson’s expectancy will be lower than when the goals are 
aligned. 
 
 Hypothesis 1a examined the main effect of the two-level factor Alignment on the 





covariates.  There was a significant main effect of this factor indicating that a lower level 
of expectancy is associated with conditions of misalignment of the goals of the sales 
force compensation and pricing strategies (Aligned: M = 5.27, SD = .94; Misaligned: M = 
4.71, SD = 1.28; F = 7.33, p ≤ .01).  Hypothesis 1a is supported.  
 
H1b: When the goal of the sales force compensation strategy is profit 
maximization and the goal of the pricing strategy is market share growth, the 
salesperson’s expectancy will be lowest. 
  
Hypothesis 1b predicted the lowest level of expectancy would be associated with 
a specific configuration of pricing and sales force compensation goals—PM-Misalign.  
Gender and industry were controlled for in this test. First, an overall main effect of the 
type of scenario on expectancy was found to be significant (F = 3.90, p ≤ .01), so further 
differences were tested across the pairs of scenarios.  The results indicated that 
respondents in the PM-Misalign condition exhibited the lowest expectancy (M = 4.38), 
and the result was significantly different from MM-Align (M = 5.48, t = 3.27, p ≤ .001), 
marginally significantly different from PP-Align (M = 4.97, t = 1.75, p = .08), but not 
significantly different from MP-Misalign (M = 4.76, t = 1.23, ns). Hypothesis 1b is 
partially supported.  
Hypothesis 2 Instrumentality 
Hypothesis 2a predicted the main effect of two-level factor Alignment on 
dependent variable Instrumentality.  This study included three measures of 





There was no support for INST_Monet, or for Inst_Perf_Org differing across the aligned 
and misaligned conditions. A follow up assessment focused only on the customer-facing 
part of instrumentality, represented by two items: “if I achieve my sales goal I will be 
viewed more favorably by my customers” and “if I achieve my sales goal I will have 
fewer complaints from my customers.”  An ANCOVA was performed with the variable 
representing the two customer facing items as the dependent variable, and Alignment as 
the independent variable, and the control variables were Two_Cat_Industry and 
Two_Cat_Commission. The results were not significant. (Alignment: M = 4.12, SD = 
1.63; Misaligned: M = 4.10, SD = 1.34; F = .20, p = .65).  Hypothesis 2a was not 
supported. 
 
H2b. When the goal of the compensation strategy is market share growth and the 
goal of the pricing strategy is profit maximization, the salesperson’s 
instrumentality will be the weakest.  
 
Hypothesis 2b predicted the weakest instrumentality would exist in a specific 
configuration of pricing and sales force compensation goals—MP-Misalign 
(compensation- market share, pricing- profit).  First, an overall main effect of the type of 
scenario on instrumentality was found to be significant (F = 3.47, p ≤ .05), so further 
differences were tested across the pairs of scenarios.  However, the results were not as 
predicted. MP-Misalign (M = 4.15) was not significantly weaker than any of the pairs, 
and in fact was marginally significantly stronger than the PP-Align in instrumentality (M 





Align (M = 4.67, t = 3.20, p ≤ .01) and PM-Misalign (M = 4.21, t = 2.08, p ≤ .05).  
Hypothesis 2b is not supported.   
These are interesting results when evaluated with the findings comparing the 
aligned conditions to the misaligned conditions (in H2a). The results suggest that the 
pricing strategy was an interference factor in salesperson instrumentality.  Apparently, 
the salesperson operating in the aligned condition of MM-Align believes that he/she will 
be perceived in a positive light by the customer since the prices are low.  In contrast, in 
the PP-Align (both profit) condition, the salesperson does not believe that he/she will be 
perceived as well by the customers because the prices are high.  The salesperson is aware 
that the customer is not concerned with his/her commissions.   
In the misaligned group, the internal pressures from the selling organization seem 
to have created an interfering effect for the salesperson but not for his/her customer. In 
the condition of PM-Mis (compensation-profit, pricing- market share), the salesperson 
perceives that the recognition from the customers will be favorable as a result of the low 
prices.  The recognition from the customer will be less as a result of high prices in the 
MP-Mis (market share-compensation strategy and profit – pricing goal) condition.   
Conceptual nuances with regard to instrumentality are widespread in the literature and 
like many prior studies (Cron et al. 1988 ;Murphy & Dacin, 1998;Gibson, 2008;Miao, 
Lund, & Evans, 2009;Tyagi, 2010) this study also indicates that instrumentality remains 
an area for further future research.  






H3: The interaction of the salesperson’s expectancy and instrumentality will be 
positively related to the salesperson’s extrinsic motivation. 
  
 Hypothesis 3 suggests that extrinsic motivation is the product of an interaction 
between expectancy and instrumentality.  The results replicate the relationships found 
among these variables in previous work (Extrinsic Motivation: M = 5.51, SD = 1.03; F = 
30.813, p = ≤ .001).   Hypothesis 3 is supported. See Table 2.11 for Hypothesis 3 
results. 
Table 2.11.  Hypothesis 3 results- Extrinsic motivation 
  
 
Hypothesis 4 Behavioral Intention 
 
H4: When the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategy are 
misaligned, the salesperson’s behavioral intention will be lower than when the 
goals are aligned.  
 
Sum of Squares df t F p value
Expectancy 12.22 1 4.39 19.27 ≤ .001
Instrumentality 7.01 1 3.32 11.05 ≤.001
Expectancy * 
Customer_Facing_





 Hypothesis 4 indicates that the two-level factor alignment will influence the 
dependent variable behavioral intention.  There was a significant main effect indicating 
that salespeople with aligned goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategy 
have significantly higher intentions to strive to achieve the goals than do those 
salespeople who have misaligned goals.  This analysis included the control variables 
Two_Cat_Industry and gender, neither of which was significantly related to behavioral 
intention (Aligned: M = 80.46, SD = 15.34; Misaligned: M = 71.54, SD = 20.12; F = 
7.22, p ≤ .05).  Hypothesis 4 is supported. 
 In addition, the means for behavioral intention were significantly lower for the 
misaligned scenarios than for the aligned scenarios. A one-way ANOVA was used to 
determine whether differences in behavioral intention differed across the scenarios (F = 
3.98, p ≤ .05). Results indicated behavioral intentions were significantly different.  See 
results for hypothesis 4 in Table’s 2.12 and 2.13.  
Table 2.12.  Hypothesis 4 results- Behavioral intention  
 
 
Sum of Squares df F 
p 
value 
Alignment 2379.12 1 7.22 ≤ .05 
Industry_Code 2.12 1 0.006 0.94 
Gender 32.76 1 0.1 0.75 
     Table 2.13.  Hypothesis 4 - Behavioral intention across scenarios 
Scenarios Mean SD 
  PM 73.82 15.52 
  MP 70.72 23.25 
  PP 74.12 16.38 
  MM 84.26 12.36 
  (F= 3.98, p ≤ .05) 






Summary of Main Study Hypotheses Tests 
A summary of the Main Study Hypotheses and test results is shown in Table 2.14. 








Misaligned goals negatively 
impact salesperson 
expectancies.  






PM scenario will have the 
lowest salesperson 
expectancies. 
Main effect of 
expectancy on the 
scenarios
Partially supported. The respondents in 
the PM-misaligned condition did have 
the lowest expectancy (Mean= 4.38).  
Significantly different from the aligned 
conditions but not significantly different 
from MP- misaligned. 
Instrumentality
H2a
Misaligned goals negatively 
impact salesperson 
instrumentality




Not supported. The complex construct 
has too many "reward elements" 
(please the company, please the 
customer, please thyself) to achieve 




MP scenario will have the 
weakest salesperson 
instrumentality
Main effect of 
instrumentality on the 
scenarios
Not supported.  The complexity of 
misaligned conditions is amplified by 
the price issue in MP.
Extrinsic Motivation
H3
There will be an interaction 
between expectancy and 
instrumentality that will be 
positively related to 
extrinsic motivation 
Two-way interaction 






Misaligned goals negatively 
impact salesperson 
behavioral intention
Main effect of 









 This research provides three key findings for researchers and managers.  First, the 
results provide empirical evidence that pricing does in fact affect a salesperson’s 
evaluation of required efforts.  The salesperson evaluates the probability that a high level 
of effort, time, and activity will lead to an improvement in their level of performance.  If 
the salesperson realizes that the firm’s pricing constrains his/her performance, the result 
is a lower expectation that his/her efforts will yield an incremental increase in 
performance.  This finding is consistent with goal setting theory (Locke & Latham, 
2002), which maintains that for difficult goals, expectancy of goal achievement is 
“negatively related to performance” (p. 704).  
 Second, the findings of this research indicate that in conditions of misaligned 
goals there is the likelihood that the salesperson will not try to achieve the goals.  This 
conflicts with sales force management literature which suggests that the more behavioral-
based the control system (salary and high managerial involvement) the more the 
salesperson will pursue the goals of the company (Oliver & Anderson, 1994).  Sales force 
compensation strategies are not the only strategy that governs the efforts, intentions, and 
behaviors of the sales force.  The findings of this research indicate that pricing strategy 
also influences behavior.   
The third, finding is that occurrences of misaligned conditions are real and exist in 
business today.  Planning goal alignment is time consuming and difficult.  Companies 
may often find it much easier to price in response to customer demands and competitor 
prices. Aligning goals is costly. Alignment would likely involve paying the salespeople 
more on certain products than on others. Instead of constraining sales, alignment would 





the quality oriented customer.  Alignment may involve changing a compensation program 
as frequently as the pricing programs change. What is missing in marketing literature is 
research that investigates the effects of a firms pricing strategy on salespeople. This study 
is an initial effort to fill that gap.   
The implications of this research for sales managers are a platform for more sales 
support and for open dialogue about the effects of price on the behaviors of a salesperson.  
Sales managers are measured on the performance of their sales force and therefore have a 
vested interest in obtaining sales tools or creating a selling environment to promote sales.  
Collaboration between the sales and marketing departments on pricing programs provides 
an opportunity for the sales force to have ownership in the program prior to release. The 
collaborative process will likely be perceived by the salespeople as supportive and the 
outcome program will be viewed as a sales assistance program. When the sales force is 
involved in the creation of a strategy in which they must implement, the perception of the 
amount of expected effort required for an increased performance level will likely be 
lower.  When the sales manager comprehends the effects of misaligned goals then he/she 
can be proactive in selecting performance measures for the sales force that directs efforts 
towards the preferred goal and providing marketing with more realistic success 
thresholds. Sales managers that have an understanding of the effects of misaligned goals 
should re-evaluate failed programs to determine if goal misalignment was the cause.   
Armed with the information of this study, sales managers can facilitate an open 
dialogue with top managers about the relationship between pricing strategies and 
salesperson behavior.  Top managers expect salespeople to sell based on price.  This 





force.  Salespeople are often reluctant to mention price to top managers as to avoid the 
reputation of being a salesperson that only sells based on (low) price.  When the 
salesperson is compensated on growing market share he/she will chose the products that 
enable access to new customers or markets and those should be the low or competitively 
priced items.  When the salesperson is compensated on profit maximization he/she will 
chose the products that offer the highest margins and can still be sold. Correcting 
misaligned goals is actionable by managers, if they know what to look for.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, the central thesis of this essay was supported—a firm’s pricing 
strategy does affect the sales force. Further, the analysis confirmed support for the effects 
of expectancy; specifically, in a condition when goals are misaligned a salesperson will 
perceive lower expectancies than when goals are aligned.   
The instrumentality hypotheses were not supported.  When comparing conditions 
where the pricing goal was market share growth the salespeople responded as 
hypothesized: expectancy for the aligned goals MM-Align was higher than the condition 
of misaligned goals PM-Mis.  Unfortunately, that outcome did not hold true for the 
conditions where the pricing goal was profit maximization.  When the goal of the pricing 
strategy was to maximize profits the salespeople perceived high instrumentality (link 
between performance and reward) given a market share compensation goal.  Perhaps the 
salesperson was familiar with this scenario (MP).  Salespeople have openly admitted to 





The work of expectancy theorists has once again been confirmed, in that 
expectancy and instrumentality are positively related to extrinsic motivation.  Knowing 
how to predict extrinsic motivation is a valuable tool for supporting a sales force.   Given 
the direction of the outcomes for expectancy and goal conflict, the inference can be made 
that aligned goals positively influence levels of extrinsic motivation. Most importantly 
this research has produced results that show misaligned goals will lessen the intentions of 
the sales force to commit to achieving the sales goal.  This research has found support for 
an important but often overlooked influencer of salesperson behavior, the firm’s pricing 
strategy.  
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This study is subject to several limitations; those limitations related to the design 
of this study provide future research opportunities.  Although a benefit of this experiment 
was the ability to isolate the goals of the pricing and sales force compensation strategies 
and to test for predicted effects of the salesperson’s expectancy, instrumentality, and 
behavioral intention; a weakness, of this and other experimental research is the inability 
to replicate all of the elements that respondents experience in the selling environment. 
Future research should use different research methods in order to represent other 
variables potentially impacting the influence of pricing on the salesperson in selling 
environments.   Next, while the goal of this study was to capture the salesperson’s view 
of the firm’s pricing strategy; single-source bias is a potential limitation. Future research 
should combine self-reported data and objective data.  Compared to a single-industry or a 
single-organization design, this study more aptly casts a wide net to assess the effects of 





respondents that sell in B2B markets with in the United States and therefore readers must 
be cautioned as to the representativeness and the generalizability of the results across all 
B2B markets. A deeper examination of global markets is required for future research.   
A potential limitation of the respondents used in this study is the limited amount 
of years as a sales professional with the current company.  Most of the respondents, 67%, 
have been selling for the current company for 1-9 years; however, the average total years 
of selling experience is 15.6 years. Analysis using company sales experience as a control 
variable was not significant.  Future research may include personal variables in addition 
to traits of the salesperson such as organizational commitment, locus of control, and 
tolerance for ambiguity as these may impact behavioral intention (Teas, 1981; Singh, 
1998). The main effect of goal alignment is not a statistically significant predictor of a 
salesperson’s instrumentality.  One potential cause may be the respondents’ limited years 
of sales experience with the current company. Salespeople that have longer tenure with 
the same company may have more confidence that an increase in their level of 
performance will yield a particular reward.  The results of this study should be checked 
with a sample of salespeople that have substantially more years of experience with their 
current company.   
Moreover, the dimensions of instrumentality are complex.  The instrumentality 
construct includes the determination of a level of performance and a vast amount of 
rewards which are intrinsic and extrinsic motivators of behavior towards the determined 
level of performance.  Rewards associated with intrinsic motivation include self-
fulfillment and status (Teas, 1981). In keeping with the scope of this study, the measures 





rewards associated with extrinsic motivation.    Respondent fatigue was a concern of this 
study; however subsequent research should include a more exhaustive list of 
instrumentality measures.   
  This study measures salespersons’ behavioral intention; although intention may 
predict behavior (Ajzen, 1991); a degree of uncertainty regarding actual behavior still 
remains when the salesperson is placed in the actual sales situation. Future research 
should measure the effects of aligned and misaligned goals of the pricing and sales force 
compensation strategies on specific sales force behaviors such as opening new accounts, 
making proposals and presentations, and selling new product offerings.  
Future research that emerges from this study should investigate the relationship 
between salesperson perceived effort given aligned and misaligned goals.  It is 
anticipated that salespeople will perceive misaligned goals as more difficult therefore 
require more effort to achieve.  Findings of previous research have shown that difficult 
goals positively influence selling effort (Fang et al., 2004).  Finally, this study provides 
the foundation for future research into the importance of the motivational effects of a 
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Pricing and Sales force Compensation Goal Alignment 
November 17, 2011 (Revised 9/1/2012) 
 
 
<Introduce one another and obtain permission to record conversation. If interviewee is 
manager, use verbiage in brackets, below.> 
 
1. Please tell us the name of your company. 
 
2. What industry are you in? 
 
3. What are the products/services that you sell?  
<Probe for individually and overall in the company> 
 
We are interested in how some organizational factors that are out of your control may 
affect what you do/how you perform your job [what your sales force does/how your sales 
force performs their jobs].  
 
4. Would you please give us some basic information about your [your sales force’s] 
compensation structure? <Probe for strict salary or combination salary and commission. 
If commission, volume or dollar?> 
 
4a. Is your compensation based on profit margin goals or market share growth goals? 
< Get specific goals for sales performance.> 
 
5. In your organization, who is responsible for setting prices for products and services? 
 
5a.  Are you as a salesperson <manager> ever involved in establishing a product price 






6. Does your organization change prices on products or product lines from time to time? 
How frequently? Why do they do it? <If necessary, probe for type of adjustment, perm or 
temp, etc.> 
 
6a. Are the goals of the pricing strategies apparent or communicated to the sales force? 
< Are you as the Sales Manager part of the joint pricing planning meetings or strategy 
creation program?> 
 
7. In general, can you tell us about how the way your organization sets prices or changes 
or communicates prices affects what you do/how you perform your job? [what your sales 
force does/how they perform their jobs/ how it affects how you evaluate sales force 
performance?]  <Probe for a specific example.> 
 
7a. Can you think of a time when your sales performance was effected (goals not 
achieved or goals achieved) as a result of a pricing strategy change? <Probe for a 
specific example.> 
 
8. In general, how does your organization’s pricing approach affect your [your sales 
force’s] ability to sell effectively? Does it cost you sales/customer satisfaction? <Probe 
for either positively or negatively. Probe for example of salesperson risk or perceived 
effort.>  
 
8a.  Think about one product you sell, what do you think the objective is for how that 
product is priced when compared to the market? Do you feel the pricing makes it easier 
or harder for you to sell?<Probe for either market share or profit. Probe for example.> 
 
9. Looking back, in your experience, have you ever faced a situation in which the way the 
company priced and promoted its products did not match with your [your sales force’s] 
incentive/compensation structure? Could you walk us through that situation? Does it 






10. How well was this problem understood or acknowledged by management [across the 
firm]? <Probe for what was considered as the source(s) of the problem. Probe further as 
to whether mis-match between pricing and compensation was considered a source.> 
 
11. When you look at product pricing, how does price affect the amount of effort you 
have [your sales force has] to expend to sell a product successfully? <Probe for 
circumstances under which this happen; if manager, how it affects him/her.>  
 
12. How does the pricing approach of your organization affect your [your sales force’s] 
motivation to sell/perform? <Probe for specific example.> 
     OR 
13. Can you tell me about time when you felt any more or less motivated to sell/perform 
by price structure, price changes, or other things out of your control? <If no, probe for 
anyone else in the firm.> 
 
13a. When you look at product pricing, how does price affect the amount of customer 
satisfaction you have established [your sales force has] to sell a product successfully? 
<Probe for circumstances under which this happen; if manager, how it affects 
him/her.>  
 
13b. When you look at product pricing, does it require you to find and offer additional 
service items to your customers to offset prices enabling you [your sales force] to sell a 
product successfully? <Probe for circumstances under which this happen; if manager, 
how it affects him/her or the costs to the firm.>  
 
13c.  In your opinion, is your product pricing communicated effectively (of high 
quality- timely, easy to understand) to your customers (and maybe your competitors)?  
Is your product pricing communicated effectively (of high quality- timely, easy to 
understand) to you and the rest of the sales force?  <Probe for circumstances under 
which both effect and non-effective communication happens; if manager, how it 






14. Who sets your [your sales force’s] compensation plan? Does it change? How often?  
 
15. How satisfied are you with the way your [your sales force’s] compensation plan is 
structured? Is it a fair structure? How effective do you think it is? Does it motivate you to 
increase your sales/open new customers/only sell high margined product? <If 
manager,probe for how this affects their job performance, ease of doing their job, etc.> 
 
16. Any final comments or questions?  

































































Pricing and Sales Force Compensation  
 
 
 Thank you for agreeing to participate in this survey.  You must be at least 21 
years of age or older to participate in this study.  The goal of this study is to develop a 
better understanding of selling strategies.  Your participation is strictly voluntary.  You 
may opt out of the survey at any time with no penalty.  
 
 You will not be identified in any way.  Responses will be combined for all 
participants and studied only in the aggregate.  All of the information that you provide is 
strictly confidential.   
 
 Your voluntary participation and candid responses are vital to the study.  The 
questionnaire should take approximately 15 to 20 minutes to complete.  Instructions are 
provided for each section of the questionnaire.  
 




_ I agree and give my consent to participate in this research project.  I understand 
that participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw my consent at any time without 
penalty.   
_ I do not agree to participate and will be excluded from the remainder of the 
questions. 
If the participant chooses NOT to agree, then the participant is skipped to the end 
of the survey. 
 
Qualifier questions:  
 
Q#1. What best describes your current job?  (Salesperson, Sales Manager with account 
responsibility, Sales Manager with no accounts, VP of Sales, other type of sales 
professional with account responsibility, other type of sales professional without account 
responsibility).  
 
If Sales Manager with no accounts, VP of Sales, and other type of sales professional 
without account responsibility are chosen- then the participant is skipped to the end of 






Q#2. Do you sell in Business to Business markets? (yes, no)  








Please read the short scenario that follows and place yourself in the situation described in 
the scenario.   Responding to the survey will take 15-20 minutes of your time.  This same 
scenario will appear two more times during the survey.  You can refer back to the 
scenario throughout the survey.  
 
Scenario Version PM 
 
You work for a company that just announced their goals for the year. You are a 
sales professional for this company, and your customer base includes manufacturers and 
distributors.  You are responsible for the complete sales cycle which includes obtaining 
and conveying market and product information, completing sales reports, and 
maintaining customer relationships. The Marketing Department is responsible for 
advertising, promoting, and pricing all of the products you sell.    
 
You just found out that your sales goal for the year is to increase the profit 
margin for sales of a product line in your territory by 3%.  For this fiscal year, your 
commission will increase by an additional 3% on total monthly sales when you achieve 
your new goal of increased profit margin.  There is no earnings cap. Based on last year’s 
pricing structure you know you will have to increase your sales of this product line 
significantly in the coming year in order to receive the extra commission.  However, you 
also just learned that the Marketing Department has communicated to the market a 
“fighting” product pricing strategy with lower prices for the same product line in 
order to gain market share. Marketing has indicated that the lower prices are in effect 
for at least a year. 
 
Scenario Version MP 
 
You work for a company that just announced their goals for the year. You are a 
sales professional for this company, and your customer base includes manufacturers and 
distributors.  You are responsible for the complete sales cycle which includes obtaining 
and conveying market and product information, completing sales reports, and 
maintaining customer relationships. The Marketing Department is responsible for 
advertising, promoting, and pricing all of the products you sell.    
 
 
You just found out that your sales goal for the year is to increase the market 
share for sales of a product line in your territory by 3%.  For this fiscal year, your 
commission will increase by an additional 3% on total monthly sales when you achieve 
your new goal of increased market share.  There is no earnings cap.   Based on last year’s 
pricing structure you know you will have to increase your sales of this product line 
significantly in the coming year in order to receive the extra commission.  However, you 
also just learned that the Marketing Department has communicated to the market a 





order to maximize profits.  Marketing has indicated that the higher prices are in effect 
for at least a year. 
 
Scenario Version PP 
 
You work for a company that just announced their goals for the year. You are a 
sales professional for this company, and your customer base includes manufacturers and 
distributors.  You are responsible for the complete sales cycle which includes obtaining 
and conveying market and product information, completing sales reports, and 
maintaining customer relationships. The Marketing Department is responsible for 
advertising, promoting, and pricing all of the products you sell.    
 
You just found out that your sales goal for the year is to increase the profit 
margin for sales of a product line in your territory by 3%.  For this fiscal year, your 
commission will increase by an additional 3% on total monthly sales when you achieve 
your new goal of increased profit margin.  There is no earnings cap. Based on last year’s 
pricing structure you know you will have to increase your sales of this product line 
significantly in the coming year in order to receive the extra commission. However, you 
also just learned that the Marketing Department has communicated to the market a 
“premium” product pricing strategy with higher prices for the same product line in 
order to maximize profits.  Marketing has indicated that the higher prices are in effect 
for at least a year. 
 
Scenario Version MM 
 
You work for a company that just announced their goals for the year. You are a 
sales professional for this company, and your customer base includes manufacturers and 
distributors.  You are responsible for the complete sales cycle which includes obtaining 
and conveying market and product information, completing sales reports, and 
maintaining customer relationships. The Marketing Department is responsible for 
advertising, promoting, and pricing all of the products you sell.    
 
You just found out that your sales goal for the year is to increase the market 
share for sales of a product line in your territory by 3%.  For this fiscal year, your 
commission will increase by an additional 3% on total monthly sales when you achieve 
your new goal of increased market share.  There is no earnings cap.   Based on last year’s 
pricing structure you know you will have to increase your sales of this product line 
significantly in the coming year in order to receive the extra commission. However, you 
also just learned that the Marketing Department has communicated to the market a 
“fighting” product pricing strategy with lower prices for the same product line in 
order to gain market share. Marketing has indicated that the lower prices are in effect 








Please reflect on the scenario that you just read when answering the following questions.  
Select the response that best represents how you feel based on the scenario. Use a scale 




1. In the scenario, the goal of the sales force compensation strategy is to increase 
market share.  
2. In the scenario, the goal of the pricing strategy is to maximize profits. 
Realism check (α= .813) 
 
3. I can imagine a company actually implementing the initiatives described in the 
scenario. 
4. The sales situation described in the scenario likely occurs in business today. 
Interpretation check 
 
5. Based on the scenario, the potential 3 percent increase in my commission is __. 
(1) “very unattractive” to (7) “very attractive” 
Please consider the scenario and slide the bar to reflect your response to the following 




6. To what degree do you feel the pricing goal in the scenario is in conflict with the 
sales force compensation goal? 
Behavioral intention (α= .759) 
 
7. If you were in the situation described in the scenario, to what degree would you 
try to achieve the pricing goal? 
 
8. If you were in the situation described in the scenario, to what degree would you 
try to achieve the sales force compensation goal? 
 
Consider the scenario when you respond to the following questions.  Indicate the 
response that best represents your feelings about the statement on the scale ranging from 
(1) “strongly agree” to (7) “strongly disagree”. 
 






9. Based on the information in the scenario, if I meet my sales goal my commission 
will increase by an additional 3 percent this year. 
10. Based on the information in the scenario, reaching my sales goal will result in 
earning my commission.  
11. Based on the information in the scenario, if I achieve my sales goal I will be 
viewed more favorably by my manager.  
12. Based on the information in the scenario, if I achieve my sales goal I will attain 
more prestige within my organization. 
13. Based on the information in the scenario, if I achieve my sales goal I will be 
viewed more favorably by my customers. 
Consider the scenario when you respond to the following questions.  Indicate the 
response that best represents your feelings about the statement on the scale ranging from 
(1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”. 
 
Extrinsic motivation (α= .864) 
 
14. If I were in the situation described in the scenario, the extra money that I could 
earn from achieving the sales goal would strongly motivate my efforts.  
15. If I were in the situation described in the scenario, I would be keenly aware of the 
income rewards available to me.  
16. If I were in the situation described in the scenario, I would be strongly motivated 
by the recognition I could earn from other people.  
17. The situation described in the scenario would provide an opportunity for me to 
show others how well I can perform in my job.  
18. If I were in the situation described in the scenario, the extra commission I could 
earn would make me work harder to achieve my sales goal.  
Consider the scenario when you respond to the following questions.  Indicate the 
response that best represents your feelings about the statement on the scale ranging from 
(1) to (7). 
 
Expectancy  (α= .843 with reverse coded item) 
 
19. Given the scenario, I would estimate my chances of success in achieving the 





20. Based on the scenario, performing my duties as well as I am capable would result 
in reaching my sales goal. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree). 
21. Given the scenario, it would be unlikely that my efforts would enable me to 
achieve the goal for this product line. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree).(R)  
22. Given the scenario, the probability that I would be able to achieve the necessary 
increase in sales would be _____. (1= very low, 7=very high) 
23. Given the scenario, achieving the sales goal would be____. (1= highly unlikely, 
7= highly likely) 
The following questions are about your current job and your feelings based on your 
selling experience.  Indicate the response that best represents your feelings about the 





The following questions are about your current job and your experience.  Please insert or 
select the appropriate response.  
 
24. How many years of experience do you have as a sales professional? (fill in the 
blank) 
 
25. How many years have you worked in sales at your current company? (fill in the 
blank) 
 
26. What is your gender? (male, female) 
 
27. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Less than high 
school, High School/GED, Some college, 2-year College Degree, 4-year College 
Degree, Graduate Degree) 
 
28. What industry do you sell in? (fill in the blank)  
                                                                                       







Main Study Instrument 
 
Pricing and Sales Force Compensation 
 
Scenario Version PM  (Other scenarios were changed in the same manner) 
 
 
Please read the short scenario that follows and place yourself in the situation 
described.   Responding to the survey will take 15-20 minutes of your time.  This same 
scenario will appear two more times during the survey for your reference.     
 
You work for a company that just announced their goals for the year. You are a 
sales professional for this company, and your customer base includes manufacturers and 
distributors.  You are responsible for the complete sales cycle which includes obtaining 
and conveying market and product information, completing sales reports, and 
maintaining customer relationships. The Marketing Department is responsible for 
advertising, promoting, and pricing all of the products you sell.    
 
You just found out that your sales goal for the year is to increase the profit 
margin for sales of a product line in your territory by 3%.  If you do this, your 
commission will increase by an additional 3% on total monthly sales. There is no 
earnings cap. Based on last year’s pricing structure you know you will have to increase 
your sales of this product line significantly in the coming year in order to receive the 
extra commission.  However, you also just learned that the Marketing Department has 
communicated to the market a “fighting” product pricing strategy with lower prices 
for the same product line in order to gain market share.  These lower prices are in 
effect for at least a year. 
 
In summary, the goal of the sales force compensation strategy is to maximize 




Please reflect on the scenario that you just read when answering the following questions.  
Select the response that best represents how you feel based on the scenario. Use a scale 




1. In the scenario, the goal of the sales force compensation strategy is to increase 
market share.   (F=11.31, p ≤ .001) 
 
2. In the scenario, the goal of the pricing strategy is to maximize profits. 






Realism check  (α =.78) 
 
3. I can imagine a company actually implementing the initiatives described in 
the scenario. 
 
4. The sales situation described in the scenario likely occurs in business today. 
 
Interpretation check   
 
5.  Based on the scenario, the potential 3 percent increase in my commission is 
__. (1) “very unattractive” to (7) “very attractive” 
Please consider the scenario and slide the bar to reflect your response to the following 
questions.  Use your cursor to slide the bar from (0) “not at all” to (100) “completely”. 
 
Conflict check  
6. To what degree do you feel the pricing goal in the scenario is in conflict with 
the sales force compensation goal?  (F=5.85, p ≤ .05) 
7. In the scenario, the goal of the pricing strategy is in conflict with the goal of 
the sales force compensation strategy.  (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly 
agree”  (F=12.08, p ≤ .001) 
Behavioral intention (α= .71) 
 
8. If you were in the situation described in the scenario, to what degree would 
you try to achieve the pricing goal? 
 
9.  If you were in the situation described in the scenario, to what degree would 
you try to achieve the sales force compensation goal? 
 
Please reflect on the scenario you just read when you are answering the following 




10.  Given the scenario, I would estimate my chances of success in achieving the 
assigned sales goal to be_____.  (1= very poor, 7 = excellent) 
11.  Based on the scenario, performing my duties as well as I am capable would 
result in reaching my sales goal. (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
12. Given the scenario, the probability that I would be able to achieve the 





13. Given the scenario, achieving the sales goal would be____. (1= highly 
unlikely, 7= highly likely) 
Instrumentality (α=.83)  
Monetary reward. (Eigenvalue 1.46) (α= .74) 
 
14.  Based on the information in the scenario, if I meet my sales goal my 
commission will increase by an additional 3 percent this year. Factor .87 
15. Based on the information in the scenario, reaching my sales goal will result in 
an increase in commission. Factor .90 
16. Based on the information in the scenario, if I reach my sales goal my overall 
pay will increase. Factor .71 
Performance recognition—internal (organizational recognition) and external 
(customer facing recognition) (5 items:  Eigenvalue 3.75, α=.89)  
 
17. Based on the information in the scenario, if I achieve my sales goal I will be 
viewed more favorably by my manager.  Factor .73 
18. Based on the information in the scenario, if I achieve my sales goal I will 
attain more prestige within my organization. Factor .80 
Performance recognition--External Customer_Facing_Instrumentality (3 
items: Eigenvalue 3.45, α =.90, M = 4.14) 
 
19. Based on the information in the scenario, if I achieve my sales goal I will be 
viewed more favorably by my customers. Factor .80 
20. Based on the information in the scenario, if I achieve my sales goal I will have 
fewer complaints from my customers. Factor .93 
21. Based on the information in the scenario, achieving my sales goal, will result 
in better working relationships with my customers. Factor .834 
Extrinsic motivation (α= .88) 
 
22. If I were in the situation described in the scenario, the extra money that I 
could earn from achieving the sales goal would strongly motivate my efforts.  
23. If I were in the situation described in the scenario, I would be keenly aware of 





24. The situation described in the scenario would provide an opportunity for me to 
show others how well I can perform in my job.  
25. If I were in the situation described in the scenario, the extra commission I 
could earn would make me work harder to achieve my sales goal.  
Goal difficulty  (α= .81) 
 
When responding to these next questions please think about the degree to which the 
pricing strategy helps or hinders your ability to achieve your sales goal.  
26.  In the scenario, the pricing strategy will make it more difficult to achieve my 
assigned sales goal. (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree” 
27.  As described in the scenario, the pricing strategy makes achieving the 
assigned sales goal ___. (1) “much easier” to (7) “much harder” 
28.  Given the pricing strategy, the assigned sales goal in the scenario would be 
____. (1) “not difficult at all” to (7) “very difficult” 
Demographics 
 
The following questions are about your current job and your experience.  Please insert or 
select the appropriate response.  
 
29.  How many years of experience do you have as a sales professional? Not 
significant (F = .25, p =.62)   
 
30. How many years have you worked in sales at your current company? Not 
significant (F=1.68, p = .174) 
 
31. What is your gender? (male, female) Not significant (F=.36, p = .79) 
 
32. What is the highest level of education you have completed? (Less than high 
school, High School/GED, Some college, 2-year College Degree, 4-year 
College Degree, Graduate Degree) Not significant (F = .03, p =.99) 
 
33. What industry do you work in?  Not significant (F =.31, p =.58) 
34. What percent of your total compensation is commission?  Not significant (F 
=.39, p =.54) 
 
